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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period from July 1, 1994 through June 30,
1995 that the authors selected as being of special interest to the real estate
practitioner.
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Seton v. Swann.' The Supreme Court of Florida has eliminated any
question as to the requirements for obtaining title by adverse possession
under color of title. In 1982, the Setons acquired the lot next to the one
owned by the Swanns. A 1951 survey properly located the common
boundary, but surveys in 1959, 1972, 1976, and again in 1984 had placed
the boundary between the two lots in the wrong place. Relying on the 1984
survey, the Setons improved a strip of land which actually belonged to their
neighbors. In addition, the Swanns built a fence along the incorrect
boundary, although Mrs. Swann testified that she knew the fence was not at
the edge of her land when the fence was built. When a 1992 survey
revealed the correct boundary, the Swanns brought this ejectment action
against the Setons. The trial court, accepting the defense of adverse
possession under color of title, ruled for the Setons finding that they had
acquired title.2

1. 650 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1995).
2- Id. at 36.
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed3 and the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed the district court in an unanimous opinion written by
Justice Harding.4 Adverse possession under color of title was in this case,
and still is, controlled by section 95.16 of the FloridaStatutes as amended
in 1987. In Seddon v. Harpster,6 the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted
an earlier version of this statute to allow an adverse possessor "under color
of title" to acquire title to land which was not described in a written
instrument if it was contiguous to the land described and protected by a
substantial enclosure. Before the 1987 amendment, the statute read: "If
only a portion of the land protected by the enclosure is included within the
description of the property in the written instrument, judgment, or decree,
only that portion is deemed possessed." The supreme court held that this
language clearly required all of the claimed land to be described in a
recorded instrument in order to acquire title to it under this statute.' Thus,
Seddon was the law in effect only between 1975 and 1987.
III. BouNDARims
DuBois v. Amestoy. 10 The record in this ejectment action established
that: 1) the appellees decided, based on a government survey, the proper
boundary was a dike and ditch; 2) their neighbors' surveyor placed boundary
stakes beyond that point on land the appellees considered to be theirs; 3)
appellees pulled up the stakes and told their neighbors that they considered
the dike and ditch to be the proper boundaries; and 4) their claim was not
challenged by the neighbors. The appellees claimed that this established the
dike and ditch as the boundary by the doctrine of acquiescence. The wellestablished element for locating a boundary by this doctrine is uncertainty
or dispute as to the boundary's correct location by neighboring landowners
3. Swann v. Seton, 629 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 650 So.

2d 35 (Fla. 1995).
4. Seton v. Swann, 650 So. 2d at 38. Chief Justice Grimes and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Kogan, Wells, and Anstead concurred.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 95.16(1), (2) (1991).
6. 403 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1991).
7. FLA. STAT. § 95.16(2)(b) (Supp. 1974), amended by FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1991).
8. Note, title can be acquired by adverse possession without color of title under section
95.18 of the FloridaStatutes, but that was not discussed in this case.
9. The court expressly disapproved Turner v. Valentine, 570 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 576 So. 2d 294 (Fla.1991) and Bailey v. Hagler, 515 So. 2d
679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,587 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1991), which applied the

Seddon logic after the 1987 amendment to section 95.16.
10. 652 So. 2d 919 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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who acquiesce in a particular location for the prescriptive period. The
district court concluded that the appellees were not entitled to summary
judgment because "the record evidence permits different reasonable
inferences on the issues of mutual uncertainty, location of a boundary by the
parties, and acquiescence ... ."" The moving party must establish all the
elements and, having failed to do so, the district court reversed. 2
Evers v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. 3 The
Division of Forestry filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking to
locate the boundary of property it was leasing for a state forest from the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund. A 1984 survey revealed that the
neighboring landowners were using and claiming ownership to part of the
land. The neighbors argued that there was an old agreement among their
predecessors in title that a certain fence line constituted the boundary, and
that subsequent owners, including the Division of Forestry, had acquiesced
to that boundary.
The Division of Forestry claimed that a 1938 eminent domain
proceeding by the federal government had vitiated the prior agreement and
any boundary by acquiescence. It also claimed that the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence was not available to establish a boundary to
public lands. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Division. 14 The First District Court of Appeal reversed, in an opinion
written by Judge Mickle, finding that there were genuine issues of material
fact still in dispute. 5 First, the record did not establish that the neighbors
or their predecessors were parties to the eminent domain proceeding.
Second, the neighbors claimed that their predecessors had established a
boundary by acquiescence against the predecessors of the Division. The
First District Court of Appeal characterized the correct, but still unresolved
issue as: "whether a governmental entity can later be bound as a successor
in interest and therefore take the property subject to a previously acquiesced
to boundary. 16
Shultz v. Johnson.1 Janice Shultz brought suit in circuit court seeking
to ascertain the boundary line of her property, alleging boundary by
acquiescence, boundary by agreement, and adverse possession. After the

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 920.
Id. Judge Stevenson wrote the opinion. Judges Polen and Klein concurred.
651 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
Id.
654 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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trial court directed verdicts against Shultz in the acquiescence and agreement
claims and vacated a jury verdict in favor of Shultz on her adverse
possession claim, Shultz appealed."8
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the directed verdict entered
on the boundary by agreement claim because there was insufficient evidence
of any agreement.' 9 The court also affirmed the order vacating the jury
verdict in favor of Shultz on her adverse possession claim because there was
insufficient evidence to prove the essential element of the property being
enclosed by a substantial enclosure for the seven-year period under section
95.16 of the FloridaStatutes.20
However, it reversed and remanded on the boundary by acquiescence
claim, and set out the elements of an acquiescence claim: 1) a dispute or
uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary, implying a cognizance
by both parties that the true boundary is in doubt; 2) location of a boundary
line by the parties; and 3) the continued occupancy of, and acquiescence to,
a line other than the true boundary line for a period of more than seven
years.21 The defendant claimed that there was no uncertainty as to the true
boundary. The court disagreed, finding the requisite element of uncertainty
as to the location of the true boundary.Y
IV. BROKERS
Gauthierv. FloridaReal Estate Commission.' The Smiths advertised
their business for sale. When Gauthier, a broker, contacted them stating that
he had a potential buyer, the Smiths responded that they did not want to use
a broker or pay a brokerage commission. Subsequently, Gauthier and his
prospect joined in making a purchase offer which was accepted. When the
transaction broke down, the Smiths sued and won a $25,000 judgment
against the two co-buyers. Because the money judgment was not satisfied,
the Smiths filed a claim with the Real Estate Recovery Fund, the fund
created by the legislature to protect the public from the misconduct of real
estate brokers. After the Florida Real Estate Commission granted the claim
and suspended Gauthier's license, the broker appealed.

18.
19.
20.
21.

I at 568.

Id at 569.
d at 569-70.
Id at 568.
22. Shultz, 654 So. 2d at 569.
23. 654 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed in a soundly reasoned
opinion written by Judge Cobb, finding no basis on which to hold the fund
liable.24 The plaintiffs would be entitled to recover from the fund if they
had obtained a judgment holding that they had "suffered monetary damages
by reason of [certain enumerated] acts committed as a part of any real estate
brokerage transaction ."25 or a judgment for damages "wherein the cause
of action was based on a real estate brokerage transaction
*.26
However, Gauthier, the broker, had not acted as a broker for these sellers.
They had refused to hire him and they never relied on him as a broker. The
sole reason the deal fell through was that the buyers did not perform their
portion of the contract; the co-buyers had breached the purchase agreement,
and the sellers had obtained a judgment for breach of the purchase contract.
That judgment did not satisfy the statutory condition precedent to recovery
from the Real Estate Recovery Fund.
Judge Thompson dissented, stating that the statute does not require an
agency relationship to exist with the broker as a prerequisite to recovery
from the fund. 7 In this case, the broker first became involved in the case
in the role of a broker even though he later became a co-buyer. The Real
Estate Commission predicated recovery on its finding that the sellers' harm
resulted from incompetent drafting of the contract which the sellers allowed
Gauthier to do because he was a licensed broker. Judge Thompson argued
that the appellate court should not substitute its findings of fact for those of
the Florida Real Estate Commission.2"
Rauch v. Chama Investments, N.V.2 9 Rauch, a real estate broker,
procured a commercial tenant under a thirty-year lease for the landlord,
Chama Investments. The brokerage agreement provided that the broker's
commission was to be three percent of the gross annual rental for the term
of the lease and any extensions of it.
Twenty years into the lease, the landlord and tenant modified the lease
without the participation of the broker and after that the landlord refused to
continue making commission payments. The trial court accepted the
landlord's argument that Rauch was not entitled to further commissions
because he had not taken part in the new lease. This was apparently based

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 582.

§ 475.482(1) (1991).
Id. § 475.483(1)(a).
Gauthier,654 So. 2d at 583 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
Id.
641 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
FLA. STAT.
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upon the cases3" which hold that a broker is not entitled to a commission
under an extension clause if the parties enter into a lease after the original
expires if it is substantially different from the original.31 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in a per curiam opinion,32
finding this situation to be entirely different. Since this broker was seeking
his commission for the original term, he could not be deprived of it because
the landlord and tenant still enjoyed the benefits of the original lease,
although under somewhat modified terms. The court, however, volunteered
dicta that the broker's claim for annual commissions could be defeated by
the tenant's abandonment.
Legislation of note with regard to brokers is Chapter 95-274 which
amended section 721.20 to prohibit brokers from collecting advance fees for
listing timeshares.33
V. CONDOMINIUMS
Casa Del Mar Condominium Ass'n v. Richartz.3' The condominium
association brought an action for an injunction to prevent future acts of
physical violence against the association and its members perpetrated by Mr.
Richartz. Mr. Richartz, irate about ongoing work related to his unit, had
thrown the association president to the floor and uttered various threats. 5
The trial court erroneously dismissed the action, holding that the
association did not have standing because the dispute was between Richartz
and the association president in his individual capacity.36 Section 718.303
of the FloridaStatutes specifically allows such actions to be brought by the
association or by the individual unit owner, and the statute authorizes the
use of injunctions to enforce condominium bylaws.3 7
Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. v. Seawatch at Marathon Condo. Ass'n,
8
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the following certified
Inc.
question in the affirmative:
30. Woodard Tire Co. v. Hartley Realty, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review denied, 605 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1992); Cushman & Wakefield of Fla., Inc. v.
Williams, 551 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Strano v. Reisinger Real Estate,
Inc., 534 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review dismissed, 542 So. 2d 1334 (Fla.
1989).
31. Rauch, 641 So. 2d at 502.
32. Judges Anstead, Hersey, and Senior Judge Mager concurred.
33. See Ch. 95-274 discussed infra part XVIII.

34. 641 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

35. Id. at 470.
36. Id,

37. Id. at 470-71.
38. 658 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1994).
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Does section 718.124, Florida Statutes[(1987)], grant a condominium
association an extended period of time in which it may assert a cause
of action for damage to common elements in condominium buildings,
beyond the time granted in section 718.203, Florida Statutes [(1987)],
after unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board
of administration?39
The Seawatch Condominium was built and occupied by 1983, and
control of the association passed from the developer to the unit owners on
August 10, 1985. The association filed a section 718.203 breach of implied
warranty suit on May 13, 1988, for damages due to the developer's use of
allegedly defective concrete and metal decking resulting in cracking and
seepage of rust-stained water onto cars parked below the building.40
The statute of limitations for implied warranty actions is four years.4 '
However, section 718.124 tolls the running of the limitation period until
control of the association passes from the developer to the unit owners.42
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court's dismissal,
based on the tolling provision, but nevertheless certified the above question
for clarification. 43 The Supreme Court of Florida approved the District
Court of Appeal's decision, noting that the right to bring a warranty action
belongs to the unit owners, and that they can exercise their right collectively
through their association. 44
In his dissent, Justice Harding argued that expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,when applied to the tolling provision, indicated that it only applied
to actions in which the association was the real party in interest, and not in
actions accorded to the unit owners individually.4 5 Justice Harding found
nothing in the language of section 718.203 [breach of warranty section] to
support the majority's holding that such actions can be brought by condominium associations on behalf of the unit owners. As such, he argued that
the unit owners had sat on their rights and were using the association to
revive their cause of action.
Under the facts of this case, where the defects involved the building's
internal structure and composition, it seems more appropriate to have the
association represent the common interests of the unit owners, making
Justice Harding's position unpersuasive.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 923.
Id.

§ 95.11(3)(c) (1987).
Id. § 718.124.
Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 658 So. 2d at 923.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 926. (Harding, J., dissenting).
FLA. STAT.
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Horizons Condominium Management Ass'n. v. Salvato.46
of
condominideclaration
The
unit
in
the
condominium.
Salvatos owned a
um had an incorrect legal description of the unit, erroneously including a
side yard as part of the unit. As a result of this error the 8alvato's unit was
assessed higher ad valorem property taxes and higher condominium
assessment fees, causing a pending sale of the unit to fall through when the
potential buyer found out about the higher charges on that unit.47
The Salvatos sued for damages for the lost sale, the higher taxes, and
for reformation of the legal description in the declaration of condominium.
The trial court held in their favor. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
affirmed the reformation, but reversed the damage award.48 It reasoned
that damages for the lost sale were not based on any legally acceptable
evidence of loss. 49 The overpaid taxes were a matter for the Salvatos to
litigate against the county tax assessor, not the association.50
Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Mead.51 The Supreme Court
of Florida answered the following certified question from the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in the affirmative:
WHETHER A CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION CAN ENFORCE A
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT IMPOSED TO PAY JUDGMENTS,
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN CONNECTION
WITH A LAWSUIT BROUGHT BY UNIT OWNERS AGAINST THE
ASSOCIATION IN WHICH THE ASSOCIATION'S PURCHASE OF
REAL PROPERTY WAS INVALIDATED AS 2AN UNAUTHORIZED
ACT AND SUBSEQUENTLY RESCINDED.
The case involved the association's attempt to purchase real property
apparently valued at over $630,000. The association imposed a $1500
special assessment to pay for the purchase, and 150 unit owners brought
suit, claiming that the attempted purchase was beyond the power of the
association's board of directors. The unit owners prevailed, and their
attorneys were awarded $194,079.37 in fees. The association had to refund
the special assessment, and sought to impose another special assessment of

46. 641 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So..2d 1195 (Fla.

1995).
47.
48.
49.
50.

li at 924.
Id.

Id
Id

51. 650 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1994).

52. Id. at 5-6.
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$500 to pay for the attorney's fees resulting from the litigation. The unit
owners again sued for a declaratory judgment that the $500 special
assessment was unauthorized, and for breach of fiduciary duty arising from
the selective disbursement of the refunds to only those unit owners who
sued.
The circuit court held that the $500 special assessment was an
authorized common expense, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the association could not be authorized to impose
assessments to pay for the consequences of acts which were themselves
unauthorized.53 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Fourth District
Court of Appeal's decision and remanded with orders to affirm the circuit
court's judgment.54 The court based its decision on a logical reading of
chapter 718, finding that judgments against an association make the common
elements subject to execution and levy, and an association is empowered to
impose special assessments to protect the common elements. 5 Justice
Kogan argued in his partial dissent that the Condominium Act did not
sanction such a result, in which the unit owners were forced to pay the judgment they obtained. 6
57
Residential Communities of America v. Escondido Community Ass'n.
Escondido Community Association ("ECA"), recorded an amendment to the
declaration of condominium which prevented the sale of any condominium
unit to a person unless the occupant was fifty-five or older. The developer,
Residential Communities of America ("RCA"), sued because the amendment
was passed without the necessary approval of RCA. RCA also sought
damages and attorney's fees in the trial court, claiming that the amendment
amounted to a slander of title. The case ultimately reached the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, which ruled in favor of the developer RCA, holding that
ECA had acted in good faith, and therefore that RCA was required to prove
actual malice in order to prevail in its slander of title claim. 58 Since ECA
had made no false or malicious statement, RCA was unable to prove
damages.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc., 650 So. 2d at 8 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
645 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 151.
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Chief Judge Harris dissented, arguing that good faith and lack of malice
was irrelevant and that RCA should be awarded attorney's fees for having
to bring the suit in the first place. 9
Rosso v. Golden Surf Towers Condominium Ass'n. ° The condominium association owned a dock. Rosso used the dock to moor his forty-seven
foot sailboat. The association informed Rosso that there was a monthly
charge of $2.00 per linear foot for the exclusive use of the dock space.
Rosso paid the fee initially, but stopped paying when the association
increased the fee to $3.00 per linear foot. The association then obtained a
preliminary injunction removing the sailboat from the dock, and it sued to
collect the unpaid fees. Rosso claimed that no fee for the use of common
elements was permitted under chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes, but the
Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed."
The association can charge a fee for the use of common elements if the
declaration of condominium provides for such practice and a majority of the
association votes to adopt the practice, unless the charges relate to one
owner having exclusive use of the property.62 The court held that a genuhad met any
ine issue of material fact existed as to whether the association
63
of the alternatives to support its action in charging the fee.
Additionally, if the fee were permitted, the association would have to,
under section 718.111(4), create rules and regulations regarding the terms
of the usage fees. The district court affirmed the injunction, reversed the
summary judgment in favor of the association, vacated the award of
attorney's fees, and remanded? 4
Greens of Town 'N Country Condominium Ass'n v. Greens of Tampa,
Inc.6' The condominium association appealed a dismissal with prejudice
of its complaint against the developer and the pre- and post-turnover
directors. The cause of action was negligence in design, construction,
inspection, repair, and maintenance of the condominium's roof and electrical
wiring. The Second District Court of Appeal affrmned the dismissal based
on the economic loss rule which requires the remedy to be in contract when

59. Ma at 151 (Harris, J., dissenting).
60. 651 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
61. d at 788.

62. Id
63. Id at 789.

64. Id
65. 653 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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a contract exists. 6 6 However, it reversed the order making the dismissal
without prejudice, allowing the association to amend its complaint.67
With regard to legislation, Chapter 95-274 made important changes to
Chapter 718 as well as homeowner association provisions in Chapter 617.
Chapter 95-274 is discussed in Part XVIII.
VI. CONSTRUCTION

Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp.68 The contract provided for the N. Sinha
Corporation to build additions and improvements to the owners' home. The
corporation commenced this action to foreclose on its mechanic's lien and
for breach of contract. The homeowners counterclaimed and filed
affirmative defenses based upon claims that the work was defective. The
homeowners also filed a third-party complaint against the corporation's
president, N. Sinha, as the corporation's qualifying agent. Chapter 489 of
the FloridaStatutes requires that a business organization such as a corporation, acting as a contractor, have an individual licensed contractor act as the
"qualifying agent" for the corporation. 69 The homeowners claimed that the
statute's imposition of duties on the qualifying agent to supervise the
construction impliedly created a private cause of action for breach of that
duty.7 ° The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed the claim because N.
Sinha individually was not a party to the contract. The Supreme Court of
Florida, in an unanimous opinion written by Senior Justice McDonald, 7
agreed. The court stated that "legislative intent, rather than the duty to
benefit a class of individuals, should be the primary factor considered by a
court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does
not expressly provide for one., 72 It found no evidence in the language of
the statute or the legislative history suggesting the legislature intended to
create a private cause of action. The general rule is that a statute which
provides for the safety or welfare of the general public will not be construed
to create a private cause of action in the absence of express language.
Consequently, no cause of action existed against the qualifying agent for
breach of his supervisory duties.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1137.
Id.
644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994).
FLA. STAT. § 489.119 (1991).
Murthy, 644 So. 2d at 985. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.105(4), 489.115 (1991).
Chief Justice Grimes and Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan, and Harding concurred.
Murthy, 644 So. 2d at 985.
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Hendry Corp. v. Metro-Dade County.73 This case involved a contract
to demolish the old Rickenbacker Causeway connecting Key Biscayne to the
mainland. The County withheld part of the payment under the contract
when the contractor failed to complete the work as scheduled. Hendry sued
the County, alleging the County was liable for costs .arising from unexpected
site conditions which it failed to disclose (such as subsurface debris and
pilings of wood instead of concrete, both making the job more difficult).
The trial court rejected Hendry's request to have the jury instructed that the
County had a duty to disclose all available information on the project and
to warrant that plans and specifications provided were full, complete, and
accurate.74 The district court held that was not an error.75 Judge Jorgenson's majority opinion stated, "our courts have recognized only that the
government has an affirmative
duty to provide bidders with information that
76
them.
mislead
not
will
Judge Baskin dissented based upon the terms of the contract. The
contract contained a differing site condition ("DSC") clause which provided:
The Contractor shall promptly, and before such conditions are
disturbed, notify the Engineer in writing of: (1) Subsurface or latent
physical conditions at the site differing materially from those indicated
in this Contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at the site, of an
unusual nature, differing materially from those ordinarily encountered
and generally recognized as in work of the character provided for in this
Contract. The Engineer will promptly investigate the conditions, and if
he finds that such conditions do materially differ and cause an increase
or decrease in the Contractor's cost of, or the time required for,
performance of any part of the work under this contract, whether or not
changed as a result of such conditions, an equitable adjustment will be
made and the contract modified accordingly.77
This type of clause is common in public works contracts. It "shifts the
normal contractual risk of additional costs incurred from an unexpected
condition from the bidder [i.e., the contractor] to the contracting public

73. 648 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.
1995). This replaces the original opinion at 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2301a which was withdrawn

after the granting of a motion for rehearing.
74. Id. at 141.
75. Id. at 142.
76. Id. at 141 (citations omitted).

77. Id.
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authority."" s The contractor need not allege or prove fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the public authority. Judge Baskin concluded that
the requested jury instruction was accurate given the DSC clause in this
contract and thus the contractor should have been entitled to reversal.
Hummel v. Stenstrom-Strump Construction & Development Corp.79
Owners of land entered into a contract for the construction of a home on
their lot. The builder submitted the plans to the City of Sanford for
approval, and then built the home. After the City issued a certificate of
occupancy, the landowners moved in. A short time later, stormwater caused
significant physical damage to the home and the contents. The landowners
sued the builder under a variety of theories and also sued the City of
Sanford for negligence in approving the plans and inspecting the builder's
work, for breach of the City's warranties contained in the certificate of
occupancy, and for negligent operation and maintenance of its stormwater
drainage system. The City asserted sovereign immunity and argued that it
owed no duty to the plaintiffs.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal ° affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the City for negligence in approving the plans and
inspecting the construction, as well as the claims for breach of warranties
based on the certificate of occupancy. 8' This case presented a novel
situation because this landowner was the one who had paid the inspection
fee to the City.82 Regardless of that distinction, the court followed the
policy set out by the Supreme Court of Florida in TrianonPark Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,3 where it said, "[w]e find that the
enforcement of building codes and ordinances is for the purpose of
protecting the health and safety of the public, not the personal or property
interests of individual citizens... ,,84 The district court, however, reversed
the trial court's dismissal of the action based on failure to maintain and
Such actions may be brought
operate its stormwater drainage system.

78. Hendry Corp., 648 So. 2d at 143 (Baskin, J., dissenting).
79. 648 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
80. Chief Judge Harris wrote the opinion in which Judges Goshorn and Diamantis
concurred.
81. 648 So. 2d at 1240.
82. Compare Victoria Village G Condominium Ass'n v. City of Coconut Creek, 488 So.
2d 900 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 497 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1986) with Friedberg
v. Town of Longboat Key, 504 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
83. 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
84. Hummel, 648 So. 2d at 1240 (quoting Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 922-23).
85. Id. at 1240-41.
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against municipalities if their drainage systems fail to operate as intended or
fail to meet the standards required by the building codes.86
Martin v. Jack Yanks Construction Co. 7 The homeowner appealed
the trial court's judgment in favor of Yanks Construction, holding that the
landowner had breached the construction contract the parties had entered
into, and denying Martin punitive damages in its action to remove a lien
fraudulently filed by Yanks.
Shortly after Hurricane Andrew, the landowner signed a repair
"proposal" to return the home to its pre-hurricane condition with the final
price for the work to be worked out between Yanks and Martin's insurer.
After the landowner prevented Yanks from commencing the work, Yanks
filed a claim of lien for the entire $107,208.60 insurance check issued by
Martin's insurer, arguing that it was entitled to file the lien based on the
underlying contract.
The Third District Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Judge Nesbitt,
agreed with the homeowner. It held the contract was void for indefiniteness
because of the "absence of a definite price or a means of determining a
price not left solely to the contractor's discretion ... ."88 The court also
concluded that the landowner was entitled to claim punitive damages under
Florida Statutes section 713.31. A contractor may have a lien "for any
money that is owed to him for labor, services, materials, or other items
required by, or furnished in accordance with the direct contract."8 9 Since
Yanks had not furnished anything, the lien was held to be fraudulent.
Nystrom v. Cabada.9° Nystrom built his own house even though he
was not a licensed contractor. After living there for about one year, he sold
it. The buyer experienced problems with walls cracking and doors sticking.
Engineers inspected the property and reported it to be hazardous. The buyer
sued, claiming breach of implied warranty, fraud, rescission of contract,
breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the county building code.
After winning on the merits, the court gave the buyer the option of
rescinding the purchase and getting back the purchase price or a damage
judgment for the full purchase price. Of course, she chose the latter because
that meant she could also keep the property and continue to live in the
house. The Second District Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Judge

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1240; see Slemp v. City of North Miami, 545 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1989).
650 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
IeL at 121.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.05 (1993)).

90. 652 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Patterson, affirmed9 on the issue of liability, holding that the Nystroms
had a duty to disclose the defects and the fact that the house was built by
an unlicensed contractor. The court reversed on the issue of damages,
however, holding that Cabada should not have been given the option of
obtaining a money judgment for the full purchase price of the property and
keeping the property.92 Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial
on the issue of damages.
Oriole Homes Corp. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc.93 The
developer and the utility were involved in a dispute over who should bear
the cost of road widening. Florida Statutes sections 125.42 and 337.403
allocate responsibility between a public body and a utility in a road
widening or extension case. Judge Glickstein's opinion relied upon the first
district's interpretation of an earlier statute9" to reach the conclusion that
the developer must bear the cost of road widening when the decision to
widen to road is made by a developer for private benefit.
VII. COVENANTS, DEEDS, AND RESTRICTIONS
Antioch University v. Dept. of NaturalResources.95 Antioch University sued to enforce the reverter clause contained in two deeds which
conveyed land in Broward County to the State of Florida with the proviso
that it "shall be used and devoted solely and exclusively for State Park
purposes .... 96 The land became known as Hugh Taylor Birch State
Park, named after the original grantor, who granted the reverter interest to
Antioch. The basis for Antioch's claim to enforce the reverter was that the
installation of storm water outfall pipes, use of structures as concession or
refreshment stands, the presence of a Department of Transportation trailer,
power lines and water mains, and the operation of a landfill or dump
violated the exclusive use provision in the deeds. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision holding that the above did not
violate the deed97conditions and that Antioch was not entitled to enforce the
reverter clause.

91. Acting Chief Judge Danahy and Judge Fulmer concurred.
92. Nystrom, 652 So. 2d at 1268.
93. 641 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
94. Century Constr. Corp. v. Central Tel. Co., 370 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 338.19 (1977)).
95. 647 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 270 (Fla.
1995).
96. Id. at 915.
97. Id. at 915-16.
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Blue Reef Holding Corp., Inc. v. Coyne.9" Blue Reef appealed the
denial of a temporary injunction after the trial court determined that a
declaration of restrictions to real property gave a developer the right to
change the size and configuration of the recreation area in the development
without obtaining the consent of the owners. The developer of Jupiter Key
recorded covenants and restrictions describing the recreation area and stating
that the designated area could only be used for recreational purposes. The
declaration also stated that the covenants could be amended by the developer
without consent of the owners, but "no amendment to this declaration shall
be effective which would increase the liabilities of the then Owner or
prejudice the rights of a then Owner... to utilize or enjoy the benefits of
the then existing Common Property unless the Owner or Owners . . .
consent to such amendment. . . ."" The developer reduced the size of the
recreational area without recording any amendment, and without obtaining
the consent of the appellant owner.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the
temporary injunction because the reduction meant that the land was not
going to be used only for recreational purposes, and it prejudiced the rights
of the owners to enjoy the "then existing Common Property" in violation of
the covenants."°° Consent from the owners was required.' 0'
Brower v. Hubbard." The Browers owned a single-family home in
a subdivision called Suburban Acres. The deed to their property contained
restrictive covenants prohibiting any building in excess of two stories in
height, and prohibiting noxious or offensive activity which may be a
nuisance to the neighborhood. Their eighty-seven foot tower antenna was
held to be a violation of these covenants, and they were ordered to remove
it and to refrain from further radio transmissions. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling that the antenna had to be
removed, but reversed on the prohibition against further transmission on
grounds that this part of the decision was overly broad."0 3
Dolphins Plus, Inc. v. Hobdy.'" Dolphins Plus is a volunteer
nonprofit organization dedicated to caring for and rehabilitating injured or
sick marine mammals in Key Largo. The organization owns land in Key

98. 645 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
99. IM at 1054.

100. Id. at 1055.
101. Id.
102. 643 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

103. Id. at 29.
104. 650 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Largo Ocean Shores addition subdivision, as does Hobdy and several others.
Hobdy and others sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Dolphins
Plus because the organization had fenced in the area depicted on a platted
subdivision as a "boat basin," and used it as a pen for the injured marine
mammals. Dolphins Plus had previously obtained a lease from the heirs of
the subdivision developer to use the "boat basin" as a pen, and had also
obtained permission from Monroe County and the Department of Environmental Regulation. °5
Hobdy and the other property owners argued that the fence and
Dolphins Plus's use of the basin for purposes unrelated to the mooring of
boats violated the plat restrictions and unreasonably interfered with their use
and enjoyment of the basin. The Declaration of Restriction reads: "No
structure, building, dock, ramp, barge or any other thing or condition shall
be permitted to impede or obstruct navigation in the waterway; boat basins
excepted ...."106
The trial court ruled in favor of the objecting property owners, holding
that the restriction and the term "boat basin" clearly prohibited Dolphins
Plus's use of the basin as a pen.'0 7 Furthermore, the lease from the
developer's heirs did not release or terminate the plat restriction. The Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed, stating that, "a restriction imposed alike
upon all the lots of a block or tract of land cannot be released to one
purchaser or his grantee without the assent of0 the
other purchasers, or their
8
grantees, for whose benefit it was imposed."'
Metropolitan Dade County v. Sunlink Corp."° Sunlink entered into
a contract to sell forty acres of vacant land in northern Dade County. The
land was encumbered by a restrictive covenant which prevented the land
from being sold to anyone other than an entity owned, controlled by, or
affiliated with AT&T. The covenant was created before AT&T was restructured, and Sunlink was a former AT&T affiliate. The covenant was to run
from December, 1974, for thirty years, and to be extended automatically for
successive ten-year periods unless an instrument recorded and signed by a
majority of the then owner(s) of the real property, and a majority of those
owners within 500 feet of the boundary of the property, agree to change the

105. Id. at 213-14.
106. Id. at 214.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 3173 (4th
ed. 1962)).
109. 642 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.
1995).
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covenants in whole or in part, providing the covenants have first been
released by the [Dade County] Commission. The prospective buyer did not
fit this restriction and the County argued that Sunlink could not sell the land
without obtaining the permission of the several thousand neighboring
property owners to release the restrictive covenant.11
Sunlink sued in circuit court, seeking termination of the covenant due
to changed circumstances, and argued in the alternative that the covenant
was an unlawful restraint against alienation. The circuit court granted
Sunlink summary judgment, holding that the covenant was an illegal
restraint against alienation, and the County appealed."'
The initial
decision from the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court.
However, the County's motion for a rehearing en banc was granted and the
en banc court reversed, instructing Sunlink to seek the permission to release
the covenant from the neighboring property owners. The court held that the
restriction was not an unreasonable restraint against alienation because it
was subject to cancellation or modification and was not perpetual. 2 The
goal of the covenant, to preserve the character of the neighborhood for the
general welfare of the public, was reasonable.
Judge Baskin's dissent restated the law in Florida on the validity of
restraints against alienation: validity is determined by measuring the term
of duration of the restraint, the type of alienation precluded, and the size of
the class precluded from taking. Here, Judge Baskin argued that these
factors clearly indicated that the restraint should be void, and criticized the
majority's reliance on Metropolitan Dade County v. Fountainbleu Gas &
Wash, Inc."' That case dealt with an attempt to circumvent a zoning
restriction, which Judge Baskin explained is a different issue from an
unreasonable restraint against alienation."1
Judge Cope argued that the answer to this case was given in Davis v.
Geyer."5 The Supreme Court of Florida in Davis held that "[a] condition
to alien only to a particular person ... is void . . ." citing the Statute of
Quia Emptores in support of its decision.' 16 Judge Cope went further,
however, stating that the remedy in such a case should be determined by an

110. Id.
111. Id. at 552.
112. Id. at 556.
113. Id. (Baskin, J., dissenting); see Metropolitan Dade County v. Fountainbleu Gas &
Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
114. Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 556.
115. Id. at 558; see Davis v. Geyer, 9 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1942).
116. Davis, 9 So. 2d at 730.

Nova Law Review

Vol 20

evidentiary hearing, because the covenant may have 7been taken into
consideration when negotiating the sale of the property."
Legislation impacting the law of covenants consisted of Chapter 95-274
which provides in relevant part, that homeowner association covenants
survive after tax and foreclosure sales.118
VIII. EASEMENTS
Cook v. Proctor & Gamble Cellulose Co."' Proctor & Gamble
brought an action to establish a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress
over property owned by the appellants Cook and Rives. Proctor & Gamble
had no action in its own right because the property owners' predecessor in
title had given Proctor & Gamble's predecessors permission to construct and
use the roadway. In fact, the former owner used the road herself. The land
in question consisted of the southernmost 700 feet of a twenty-two mile road
which had been used for many years by Proctor & Gamble and its
predecessor for commercial purposes. In support of its action to establish
a public easement, Proctor & Gamble presented evidence of only four
people who testified that they had used the road for more than the required
twenty years.
The requirements in Florida to obtain a right of use by prescription are:
actual, continuous, adverse, and inconsistent uninterrupted use of the lands
of another for the prescribed twenty-year period. Therefore, Proctor &
Gamble sought to establish a "public" prescriptive easement. The trial court
held in favor of Proctor & Gamble and the property owners appealed."
The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that use by four people
was insufficient to establish substantial use by the public so as to lead to a
public prescriptive right.'' In order to establish a public prescriptive
easement, the land must be used by the public in general. " Additionally,
the First District Court of Appeal held that Proctor & Gamble's use was not
inconsistent with the owner's use of the land. "Doubts as to the creation of
a prescriptive right must be resolved in favor of the landowner .... Under

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 558.
Chapter 95-274 is discussed later in this article. See infra part XVIII.
648 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 181.
Id.
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Florida law, any use in common with the owner is presumed to be
subordinate to the owner's title and with the owner's permission."''
Finally, the court held that Proctor & Gamble lacked standing to assert
the rights of the public.' 24 It was plain to the court that Proctor &
Gamble's purpose in bringing the action was not to benefit the public, but
instead to benefit its own interests, because during the three years of
litigation, no other member of the public or representative body had come
forward to establish the easement. The court stated that in order to bring an
action to redress a public wrong, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he
suffered or is threatened with some special, particular, or peculiar injury
growing out of the public wrong."z Associate Judge Reynolds disagreed
on the standing issue in his partial dissent, arguing that the longer route
Proctor & Gamble must now take was a sufficient injury to provide
standing.' 6
Enzor v. Rasberry.27 Rasberry filed suit to extinguish Enzor's claim
to a common law way of necessity across Rasberry's land. The trial court
entered a final judgment quieting title to the disputed road, holding that
Enzor had reasonable and practicable alternative means of ingress and egress
to his property.'
The First District Court of Appeal disagreed, reversed,
29
and remanded.
Section 704.01(1) of the FloridaStatutes codifies the common law rule
of an implied grant of a way of necessity where:
a person... grants lands to which there is no accessible right-of-way
except over his land .... Such an implied grant or easement in lands
or estates exists where there is no other reasonable and practicable way
of egress, or ingress and same is reasonably necessary for the beneficial
use or enjoyment of the part granted or reserved. An implied grant
arises only where a unity of title exists from a common source other
than the original grant from the state or United States. 3

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id (citations omitted).
Cook, 648 So. 2d at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id (Reynolds, J., dissenting).
648 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

128. ML at 789.
129. ld. at 795.
130. FLA. STAT. § 704.01(1) (1993).
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Once established, a way of necessity passes by each conveyance to
subsequent grantees. The proponent of an implied grant of a way of
necessity must establish three elements:
(1) both properties must at one time have been owned by the same
party, (2) the common source of title must have created the situation
causing the dominant tenement to become landlocked, and (3) at the
time the common source of title created the problem
the servient
31
tenement must have had access to a public road.
Rasberry owned three parcels and sold two of them to a Mr. Adams,
causing the conveyed parcels to become landlocked at the time when the
third parcel, retained by Rasberry, had access to a public road. Enzor
owned one of the parcels formerly owned by Adams, and, therefore, also
obtained the way of necessity. He used this easement to reach another
landlocked parcel he owned and used as a hunting camp. Later, the State
of Florida, during construction of Interstate 10, condemned a portion of
Rasberry's property and created a service road leading from a public road
through part of Enzor's easement, but stopping short of Enzor's land. Enzor
still had to use the end part of the easement to reach his property. The
service road, however, did provide an alternate route for the initial part of
the journey. Enzor made use of this new road. However, the State later
transferred the road to Okaloosa County, which vacated it and quitclaimed
the road to Rasberry. At that time, Rasberry gave Enzor permission to use
what was formerly the service road to reach his parcels. Rasberry now
wanted to revoke such permission, arguing that Enzor had another implied
easement of necessity through the parcel kept by Adams when Adams sold
one parcel to Enzor. Adams, however, obtained an easement from Rasberry
when he purchased two parcels from Rasberry. Adams then sold one of
those parcels to Enzor. When Adams conveyed one parcel to Enzor, it was
not only accessible through the parcel retained by Adams, but it was also
accessible through the easement over Rasberry's parcel. Therefore, there
existed only one easement, the original one over Rasberry's land. Although
a road was subsequently created across the parcel that Adams had retained,
Enzor had no right to use it, and the road was not always usable.'32
The First District Court of Appeal held that the original easement was
still valid because the necessity which gave rise to it still existed.'33

131. Enzor, 648 So. 2d at 791 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 794.
133. Id. at 795.
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IX. EMINENT DOMAIN

A. Condemnation
M
The Supreme Court
Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation."

of Florida considered the question, although it was not properly certified,
"[w]hether evidence of environmental contamination is relevant and
in an eminent domain valuation trial" and answered in
otherwise admissible
135
the affirmative.
In this case the subject property was a gas station with petroleum
contamination. In the valuation trial, the Department of Transportation
("DOT"), moved in limine to include evidence that the property was
contaminated, but the trial court ruled that the proffered evidence of
contamination due to the stigma that would attach to the property was not
relevant because the contamination was being remedied under the Early
Detection Incentive program, which would reimburse property owners for
the costs of eliminating the problem. The property was then valued as if not
contaminated.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, and the Supreme Court
of Florida, in an opinion by Justice Wells, affirmed in part, but reversed in
part. ' 6 Under the circumstances of the reclamation program, the property
should have been valued as if clear of contamination. However, evidence
that the existence of prior contamination would stigmatize the property,
affecting its market value, would be relevant and admissible in a valuation
trial if the proper predicate was laid. The court expressed concern over the
prejudicial nature of evidence of contamination. In order to be admissible,
the evidence of contamination must "have a basis in facts and data
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of real property valuation,
section 90.704, Florida Statutes (1993), and pass the test of section
90.705(2), Florida Statutes (1993). ''137 Evidence of sales of comparable,

contaminated property would provide an adequate factual basis. The
supreme court agreed with the trial court that evidence of the cost of
remediation should not be admitted where those costs were not to be born
by the landowner.

134. 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995).
135. Id. at 922.
136. Id. at 925.

137. Id.
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Justice Anstead expressed his concern that the majority opinion was
going too far, answering questions that had not been asked. 3 ' Quite
prudently, he would have simply answered the question in the affirmative
and awaited later cases to elaborate on issues of evidence and valuation.
Basic Energy Corp. v. Hamilton County. 13 9 The City of Jasper
wanted to attract the prison industry for economic reasons, such as to
provide jobs for local citizens and add to the City's revenues. Consequently, it commenced this condemnation action to acquire land which it would
offer to donate to the state as a site for a state prison. The property owner
challenged the taking, contending that the City had no authority to exercise
eminent domain powers for this purpose. The landowner lost in the circuit
court, but prevailed in the First District Court of Appeal. This was not a
case which analyzed the limits of the eminent domain power, but rather
focused on the limits of power granted to this particular governmental entity.
The court noted that the City is granted power by the Florida Constitution'o to perform municipal functions, but concluded that securing the
construction or operation of a state prison did not fit within the scope of
municipal function. Furthermore, the statutory grant of authority to
construct and operate jails to municipalities14 ' did not include authority to
engage in prison construction or operation. A prison and a jail are not the
same thing. A jail is a short-term lockup, holding prisoners awaiting trial
or serving short sentences and operated by a city or county. A prison, on
the other hand, is for long-term incarceration and is operated by the state.
Department of Transportation v. Manoli.4 2 DOT appealed the
amount awarded to the appellee as business damages after DOT took a
portion of appellee's gas station as part of its highway widening project.
The business was incorporated, but the appellee was personally the lessee
of the gas station and worked there as an employee of the corporation.
Appellee's expert convinced the trial court that the wages the appellee
received should not be considered in calculating his business loss. His
damages were calculated by deducting from gross income the cost of goods
sold, wages, rent, and other operating expenses, but not the wages he
received as an employee. Judge Klein, writing for the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, concluded" that was incorrect. He noted that business

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 926.
652 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
FLA. STAT. § 180.06 (1993).
645 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Judges Hersey and Gunther concurred.
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damages are entirely based upon a statute, 144 not the constitution. Business damages are based on lost profits. To ignore the profits he had
received, even in the form of wages, would inflate his damages. The court
noted that the amount of lost profits is not the only way of computing
business damages, but that when lost profits is the method used, the
reasonable value of the self-employed owner's services must be deducted.
Downtown Square Assoc. v. FloridaDepartment of Education.145 In
this condemnation action, the landowner sought fees for attorneys and
experts. At the time that the litigation began, Florida Statutes section
73.092 provided:
(1) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings,
the court shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the
client [condemnee] from the services rendered.
(2) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings,
the court shall give secondary consideration to: (a) The novelty,
difficulty, and importance of the questions involved. (b) The skill
employed by the attorney in conducting the cause. (c) The
amount of money involved. (d) The responsibility incurred and
fulfilled by the attorney. (e) The attorney's time and labor
reasonably required adequately to represent the client in relation
to the benefits resulting to the client.
(4) In determining the amount of attorney's fees to be paid by
the petitioner, the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant would ordinarily be expected to pay if the petitioner
[condemnor]
were not responsible for the payment of fees and
6
costs.

14

The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Judge Polen, 47
decided that this list was exclusive, relying without elaboration on an earlier
supreme court decision. 141 Consequently, the trial court erred when it
considered factors outside the list, although the court did not specify what

144.
145.
146.
566-67.
147.
148.

FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1991).
648 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993), amended by Ch. 94-162, § 3, 1994 Fla. Laws 564,
Chief Judge Dell and Judge Stone concurred.
Schick v. Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 599 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1992).
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those factors were. Because the trial court had been thoughtful enough to
specify what the reasonable fees would have been had it not considered
those additional factors, the Fourth District Court of Appeal simply reversed
and ordered fees to be awarded on that basis. 49
JFR Investment v. Delray Beach Community Redevelopment Agen5
cyAfter the City declared an area to be blighted and in need of
rehabilitation, it created a community redevelopment agency ("CRA"). The
CRA moved to take this land with plans to use it:
for off street parking and two historic homes will be relocated there.
One of these homes will serve as the CRA headquarters and the other
is expected to house the Palm Beach County Historic Preservation
Board. A walkway through the block will link the Old School Square
with municipal offices and other structures to the west.... The parking
facilities planned ...will serve as overflow parking for the tennis
center and the community center and also provide parking for offices
to be located in the relocated historic houses.'
The landowner challenged the taking, claiming that it was being done
for private rather than public use because the parking would be used for the
benefit of private development. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in this
per curiam decision, 152 properly distinguished this case from Baycol, Inc.
v. Downtown Development Authority of City of Fort Lauderdale. 53 The
court observed that this project "will end up with a combination public use,
retail, office, and entertainment center that will need parking."'"
The
record supported the conclusion that the parking provided on this land
would primarily benefit the public usage.' 55 The private benefit was
incidental, and an incidental private use of taken land is permissible.
White v. Department of Transportation.5 6 The landowner was a real
estate broker. At the condemnation trial, he did not call an appraiser but
offered his own testimony regarding the value of the property. On crossexamination, he was required to publish portions of an appraisal report,
revealing that he had hired an appraiser, received that appraiser's report, and

149. 648 So. 2d at 1266.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

652 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 1262.
Judges Stone, Warner, and Farmer concurred.
315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
652 So. 2d at 1263.
Id.
645 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

1995]

Brown / Grohman / Valcarcel

did not call that appraiser as an expert. According to the Fifth District, this
was reversible error because it might create the inference that he was
concealing or covering up evidence harmful to his case. A brief opinion by
Judge Griffin"5 7 pointed out the district court had, a decade earlier in Sun
Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando,158 established a rule allowing a
landowner to use the condemnor's expert only where such inference is
carefully avoided. The rule was here applied with equal force against the
condemnor.
B. Inverse Condemnation
Rubano v. Department of Transportation.5 9 The Supreme Court of
Florida, in an opinion written by Justice Anstead,' 6° answered the following certified question in the negative:
DID THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ENGAGE IN A
COMPENSABLE TEMPORARY TAKING OF ACCESS WHEN IT
ELIMINATED PETITIONERS' DIRECT ACCESS TO A STATE
ROAD BY PLACING PETITIONERS' PROPERTY ON A SERVICE
ROAD, ELIMINATED A PROTECTED U-TURN AND REPLACED
IT WITH ANOTHER U-TURN WHICH ADDED ONE AND ONEHALF MILES OF TRAVEL TO REACH THE PROPERTIES, AND
SEVERED THE CONNECTIONS FROM INTERSTATE 95 TO
STATE ROAD 84?161
This case involved five separate inverse condemnation actions which
were consolidated. The properties were all located in Broward County west
of 1-95 between Southwest 26th and 23rd Terrace on the north side of S.R.
84. Before the construction, the properties were accessed by eastbound
traffic on S.R. 84 by making a u-turn. Traffic exiting the properties could
get back on the eastbound lanes of S.R. 84 by another u-turn. During
construction of a new bridge on S.R. 84 over 1-95, a u-turn was eliminated
so that eastbound traffic from S.R. 84 would have to go an additional mile
and a half to reach the property and the property could not be directly

157. Judges Cobb and Peterson concurred.
158. 407 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
159. 656 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1995).
160. Chief Justice Grimes and Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan, and Harding concurred.
Justice Wells also wrote a short special concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Grimes
concurred.
161. 656 So. 2d at 1265.
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reached from S.R. 84. It was now reached only through a service road. In
addition, the construction eliminated an exit from 1-95 to S.R. 84, so 1-95
traffic could not reach the properties by that direct route. 1-95 traffic would
have to exit onto 1-595 and then exit onto S.R. 84 which runs parallel to it.
The supreme court held that this did not constitute a compensable
taking. It cited Department of Transportationv. Gefen 62 for the proposition that no one has vested rights to the maintenance of a public highway
in any particular place. 163 Similarly, no owner has a vested right in the
continuation of traffic flow past his property. In this case, access was not
completely eliminated, not even temporarily. The petitioners just lost their
most convenient means of access.
Justice Wells agreed with the court's analysis and conclusions, but was
uncomfortable with the results.' 64 With Chief Justice Grimes' concurrence, he called on the legislature to provide relief to the victims of long
disruptions caused by road construction.
Weaver Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee.165 The lessee of a commercial
gas station and convenience store enjoyed two points of access from the
main street. As part of a road improvement scheme, the City took a strip
of land along the frontage. The City also constructed a traffic control island
on city-owned property. This island reduced the width of one access from
forty-four to twenty-seven feet. In response, the lessee sought statutory
business damages and won $94,000 in the trial court. The First District
Court of Appeal reversed, but certified the following question concerning a
1987 Florida statute:
DOES SECTION 73.071, FLORIDA STATUTES, PERMIT A CLAIM
FOR STATUTORY BUSINESS DAMAGES FOR AN ALLEGED
SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT OF ACCESS RESULTING FROM
GOVERNMENTAL CONSTRUCTION ON EXISTING RIGHT-OFWAY ABUTTING THE OWNER'S PROPERTY, WHERE NO LAND
IS TAKEN? 166
In an unanimous opinion written by Justice Overton,' 67 the Supreme
Court of Florida answered the certified question in the negative. A loss of
162. 636 So. 2d 1345-46 (Fla. 1994).
163. 656 So. 2d at 1267-68.
164. Id. at 1271.

165. 647 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1994).
166. City of Tallahassee v. Boyd, 616 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
167. Chief Justice Grimes, and Justices Shaw, Kogan, Harding, Wells, and Anstead
concurred.
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access can constitute a taking for which compensation is required even
though no land is actually lost. The taking occurs when a landowner has
suffered an unreasonable interference with the access to or from his property
to an existing street. However, the loss of access must be substantial. The
supreme court quoted from its earlier opinion in Palm Beach County v.
Tessler168 that, "the fact that a portion or even all of one's access to an
abutting road is destroyed does not constitute a taking unless, when
considered in light of the remaining access to the property, it can be said
that the property owner's right of access was substantially diminished."169
The facts in the case at bar did not support the conclusion that a taking had
occurred and, consequently, business damages could not be recovered.
The court went on to provide some interesting dicta. It reiterated that
the legislature had provided for business damages, available only when there
has been a partial taking of land. The statute did not provide for business
damages where there had been a partial taking of access, even though that
required compensation. Although this case arose in conjunction with the
condemnation of a strip of land, the basis for the business damages claim
was the creation of the traffic island limiting access. Consequently, even if
the loss of access had required compensation, the landowner would still not
have been entitled to statutory damages for injury to the business.
Department of Transportation v. Gefen."70 The landowner prevailed
in the trial court in an action for inverse condemnation, but lost on appeal.
She then filed a motion for appellate attorney's fees based upon Florida
Statutes, section 73.131(2). 7 The statute provides for a condemning
authority to pay appellate attorney's fees except in cases where the
landowner had appealed unsuccessfully, and that was not the situation in this
case. That statute had been interpreted to apply to inverse condemnation
cases, 172 so it would appear at first glance that the landowner would be
entitled to attorney's fees here. The supreme court disagreed. In unani-

168. 538 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 1989).
169. Weaver Oil Co., 647 So. 2d at 821-22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Palm Beach
County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 1989)).
170. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994).
171. Section 73.131(2) provides in relevant part: "(2) The petitioner shall pay all
reasonable costs of the proceedings in the appellate court, including a reasonable attorney's
fee to be assessed by that court, except upon an appeal taken by a defendant in which" the
judgment of the lower court shall be affirmed." FLA. STAT. § 73.131(2) (1993).
172. County of Volusia v. Pickens, 435 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 443 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1983); State Road Dep't v. Lewis, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 192 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1966).
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mously denying the motion,'73 the court found, without elaboration, that
an unsuccessful litigant should not recover appellate attorney's fees even if
the appeal had been filed by the State. The court concluded that "a
landowner claiming inverse condemnation is only entitled to appellate
attorney's fees if the claim is ultimately successful."' 7 4
Department of Transportationv. Heckman 75 A landowner seeking
a building permit to construct an indoor gun range was required by the City
of Oakland Park to convey a seven-foot strip in exchange for waiver of
platting requirements. Later, the City conveyed the strip to the Department
of Transportation for widening the highway. When the Department of
Transportation later condemned additional portions of the owner's property
for a drainage easement, the owners sued for compensation for the taking
of the seven-foot strip, claiming inverse condemnation in that the City had
been acting as an agent for the Department of Transportation when it had
improperly required them to give up the land. The owners prevailed in the
trial court, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in an opinion written by
Judge Klein, 7 6 reversed, holding that there was no evidence of a direct
agency relationship.' 7 7 The court distinguished this case from out of state
examples' 78 in which the state agency was directly involved and thus

173. Chief Justice Grimes, Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan and Harding, and Senior
Justice McDonald all concurred in the order. The author was not identified.
174. Gefen, 636 So. 2d at 1347.
175. 644 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1194
(Fla. 1995). The original opinion, which appears at 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1926 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 14, 1994), differed from the final opinion only in that the following was deleted
from the next to last paragraph of the original: "Nor are courts unwilling to compensate
property owners for egregious conduct by local governments. See, e.g., Town of Highland
Beach v. Resolution Trust Corp., 18 F.3d 1536 (11th Cir. 1994), in which a verdict in excess
of $30 million was affirmed against a town as a result of an unconstitutional regulatory
taking of property" and the elimination of a footnote which stated: "We are aware that the
property owners have a separate lawsuit pending against the city. Although the trial court
found that the city acted improperly in this case, the city is not a party here, and our mention
of that finding in this opinion is nothing more than a description of what the trial court
found. Our conclusion does not require us to consider the propriety of the city's conduct."
19 Fla. L. Weekly at D1927 n.1.
The appellate review of the suit against the City appears as Heckman v. City of
Oakland Park, 655 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), in which summary judgment
was reversed due to the existence of a factual issue.
176. Judge Gunther concurred.
177. Heckman, 644 So. 2d at 529.
178. Roth v. State Highway Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Gaughen
v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., 554 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); Orion Corp.
v. State. 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
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liable for a taking and also because in179none of those cases had the landowner conveyed the land to the agency.
Nor did the court find there was agency by estoppel. The necessary
elements of agency by estoppel are: "(1) that the principal manifested a
representation of the agent's authority or knowingly allowed the agent to
assume such authority; (2) that the third person in good faith relied upon
such representation; and (3) that relying upon such representation such third
person has changed his position to his detriment."' 0 Therefore, DOT was
not liable under agency theory for the City's prior demand for the seven-foot
strip of land. Since the landowner's entire case against DOT was founded
on agency theory, it could not prevail.
In Judge Stevenson's dissent, he noted that the opinion of the trial court
was "well reasoned '8 1 and found sufficient facts in the record to support
12
the trial court's conclusion of fact that an agency relationship existed.
Once that had been established, the Department of Transportation, as the
principal, would be responsible for the acts of its agent, the City.
Department of Transportation v. Zyderveld.183 The Department of
Transportation had filed a map of reservation pursuant to FloridaStatutes,
sections 337.241(2) and 337.241(3) for the planned realignment of a state
road, but in 1990 the Supreme Court of Florida held that such reservations
without compensation were unconstitutional1 4 so the Department had
withdrawn the map. In 1991, Zyderveld sued for inverse condemnation,
arguing that he had suffered a temporary taking due to the filing of a map
of reservation. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landowner
on the issue of liability. The landowner had suffered a temporary taking,
and proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict
of $375,000 for the temporary taking and $70,000 for severance damages.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed after finding three errors. 5
First, the trial court had allowed the landowner's experts to testify
about the appropriate compensation for a temporary taking of the entire
property, but the Department of Transportation was prohibited from
introducing evidence rebutting the claim that the entire parcel had been

179.
180.
450, 451
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Heckman, 644 So. 2d at 530.
Id. at 529 (quoting Carolina Georgia-Carpet & Textiles, Inc. v. Pelloni, 370 So. 2d
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
ld. at 531.
Id.
647 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
Zyderveld, 647 So. 2d at 309-10.
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taken. Second, the trial court had relied upon an earlier precedent I8 6 to the
effect that the filing of the map constituted a per se taking. The Fifth
District had already receded, in an opinion approved by the Supreme Court
of Florida, 187 from that holding and had adopted the rule that even where
such a map of reservation had been filed the inverse condemnation claimant
had the burden of showing that he had been deprived of all or substantial
economic use of his property. Consequently, the landowner here was not
entitled to summary judgment on the liability issue. Finally, the court had
allowed the landowner's expert to testify on the issue of severance damages
after testifying that the whole parcel had been taken. This was an error
because severance damages are applicable only in the case of a partial
taking.
Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. Harrell.8' also
dealt with the filing of a map of reservation pursuant to FloridaStatutes,
section 337.241. In condemnation proceedings, landowners of two parcels
claimed additional damages based upon an earlier temporary taking of their
property by the filing of a map of reservation. That claim was supported
with affidavits stating that the recording of the map of reservation prevented
them from developing additional dwelling units on the property, refinancing
or selling the property although they had no plans to do any of those things
and had continued to live on the property. The Authority appealed a
judgment awarding damages and the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed.' 89 Noting that the Supreme Court of Florida had held that the
recording of a map of reservation pursuant to section 337.241 of the Florida
Statutes did not amount to a per se taking of property," 9 the court held
these assertions were insufficient to meet the burden of proving loss of all
economically beneficial or productive use.
Sarasota County v. Ex.' 91 Mr. and Mrs. Ex had sought permits to
build a condominium on their land. After being informed that the permits
could be obtained only if a ten-foot strip of land was deeded to the county,
they deeded the land to the county. This occurred in 1983. Mr. and Mrs.
186. Orlando/Orange County Expressway Auth. v. W & F Agrigrowth-Fernfield, Ltd.,
582 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 591 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1991).
187. Department of Transp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993), approved, 640 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1994); see also Tampa-Hillsborough County
Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
188. 645 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
189. Id. at 1027.
190. See Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth., 640 So. 2d at 54.
191. 645 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
1995).
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Ex lost the land through judicial sale in 1987. In 1991, they brought this
action against the County for compensation for the ten-foot strip on the
theory that the conveyance had been involuntary, meaning that they had
been coerced, and therefore amounted to inverse condemnation. Since eight
years had passed between the conveyance and the filing of the action, the
County raised the defenses of estoppel and the statute of limitations.
The Second District, in an opinion by Judge Altenbemd, " considered the proposition that, in the absence of a specific statutory period for
inverse condemnation, the adverse possession statute of limitations is
generally applied. The court however, concluded that it would not make
sense in this situation because, unlike most inverse condemnation situations
where the government is effectively adversely possessing the property, the
landowners here validly deeded the property to the government. Since the
government became the owner at that date, it could not be an adverse
possessor. That reasoning was based upon the court's finding that the
record would not support a claim that the deed was either void or voidable.
However, the lack of reasoning for that conclusion, including that duress
would be inapplicable, is troublesome. The district court did not decide
which statute of limitations did apply. It reasoned that the longest possible
statute of limitations period which might apply was seven years, 93 and
that period had expired before Mr. and Mrs. Ex had filed this action.
City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc.194 This case
also involved a statute of limitations defense although the parties there
agreed that the four-year statute should apply.195 The City appealed a
non-final order in an action finding the City liable for inverse condemnation
of the restaurant's property. The Yardarm Restaurant is located on a parcel
of land overlooking the Hillsborough Inlet with a view of the lighthouse.
In 1972, the owners decided to expand their business by building a 165-unit
hotel and marina on the lot. The City opposed the plan, and passed an
ordinance imposing a ten-story height restriction on new buildings in
Pompano Beach. Litigation challenging the restriction ensued over the next
five years, resulting in the issuance of a building permit in 1977. By then,
the restaurant was unable to finance the costs of construction on its own.
The restaurant struggled to find financing, yet continued construction. In

192. Acting Judge Campbell and Judge Fulmer concurred.
193. 645 So. 2d at 10 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.14 (1991)).
194. 641 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1197
(Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2583 (1995).
195. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(f) (1985); see also id. § 95.11(3)(p).
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1985, the mortgagee foreclosed, and the restaurant filed a bankruptcy
petition. When the stay was later lifted, the property was sold to the City.
This action was brought by the restaurant in 1987, alleging inverse
condemnation due to the City's extended obstruction of the restaurant's
attempts to build a hotel and marina. After prevailing in the trial court, the
City lost on appeal. The exhaustive and well-reasoned opinion by Associate
Judge Griffin196 concluded that this did not amount to a taking because the
activity complained of, the City's improper use of land use regulations, had
97
been struck down by the court based upon a due process challenge.
Moreover, the inverse condemnation claim would be barred by the statute
of limitations since the City's last action had taken place more than four
years prior to the institution of this suit. The court rejected the restaurant's
argument that the taking did not occur as long as the landowner continued
to contest the City's invalid regulations.
Tinnennan v. Palm Beach County.'98 The landowner petitioned the
County to rezone his property to general commercial with a special
exception to permit his planned commercial development of the property as
an office/warehouse. The county's planning and zoning board recommended
the approval, subject to certain conditions, and then the Board of County
Commissioners approved the petition but provided that: "No building
permits ... shall be issued until construction has begun for West Atlantic
Avenue from Military Trial to Jog/Carter Road as a 6 lane section plus the
appropriate paved tapers ... ."199 Because of this indefinite delay in
being able to begin his project, the landowner sued for inverse condemnation.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted, in a per curiam opinion,2"" that some uses did not require a building permit, so this moratorium on building permits had not deprived this landowner of all use of his
land. At most, there was only a temporary taking, but the extent of that
taking would still be subject to speculation. The County's decision,
although technically final after the County Commission vote, was still
subject to alteration, variance, or modification and the landowner had made
no effort to persuade the board to alter its decision nor any alternative

196. Associate Judges Cobb and Peterson concurred.
197. Yardarm Restaurant,Inc., 641 So. 2d at 1388. These might amount to temporary
takings and a basis for a successful claim under title 42, § 1983, of the United States Code,
but the court was careful not to issue any advisory opinions on those possibilities.
198. 641 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
199. Id. at 524.
200. Judge Gunther, Judge Stevenson, and Associate Judge Mickle concurred.
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proposals which might have convinced the County to lift the moratorium.
"Ripeness requires a firm delineation of permitted uses so that the extent of
the taking can be analyzed."2 1 Therefore, the inverse condemnation claim
was not ripe.
2
The Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, 02
which becomes effective on October 1, 1995, may turn out to be the most
important piece of legislation this session and possibly this decade. The
legislature has provided a remedy for situations which do not amount to a
taking under existing state or federal law, 3 but in which a landowner has
been "inordinately burdened" by the action of the State of Florida, one of
its agencies, or one of its political subdivisions. 4 An "inordinate burden"
is defined as a direct restriction or limit of an existing use or vested right so
that landowner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investmentbacked expectation in a way that is disproportionate in comparison to the
burden on others." 5 The Act provides the procedures to be followed by
a property owner in making a claim,2 6 allows settlements, and provides
for attorney's fees and costs.20 7
X. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Davey Compressor Co. v. City of Delray Beach."8 Davey Compressor was sued by the City of Delray Beach for trespass, negligence, private
nuisance, and strict liability, after Davey Compressor's chemical dumping
at its worksite contaminated some of the City's wellfields. The jury
awarded the City $3,097,488 for past damages plus $5,600,000 for estimated
future response costs. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the past
damages award but reversed on the future damages.2" The issue before
the court was whether the award for future restoration costs should be
limited to a maximum equal to the value of the property.1 0

201. 641 So. 2d at 526.
202. Ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1311 (West).
203. Id. § 1(1), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1311.
204. Id. § 1(3)(c), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1312.
205. Id. § l(3)(e), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1312.
206. Id. § 1(4), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1312.
207. Ch. 95-181, § 1(6)(c)(3), Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1311, 1314 (West).
208. 613 So. 2d 60 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted,626 So. 2d 204 (Fla.), and
decision approved, 639 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1994).
209. Id. at 63.
210. Id. at 61.
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The court discussed the "restoration" rule, which states that damages
for the wrongful injury of property are measured either by the diminution
in value or the costs of repairing or restoring the property to its prior
condition, whichever is less.2 1 This rule does not allow restoration costs
to be the measure of damages when this amount exceeds the value of the
property. The rationale for the rule is to prevent overcompensation of
plaintiffs.212
The court ruled here that the negligible risk of overcompensation did
213
not justify limiting the City's damages to the value of its wellfields.
Therefore, defendants held liable for environmental torts involving
government property may have to pay full restoration costs, even if this
amount exceeds the value of the property. In a secondary issue of whether
the City was the proper party to bring the suit, the court ruled in favor of
the City. Although the state owns natural resources such as groundwater,
the City has standing because it has the duty to supply safe drinking water
to the residents.2 14
Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation,Inc. v. Board of County
Commissioners.215 This case came to the Supreme Court of Florida on a
certified question from the United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh
Circuit.21 6 The question certified was:

UNDER EXISTING FLORIDA LAW, NOT LIMITED TO THE
STATE'S EPA-APPROVED UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL PROGRAM, WHERE A HOLDER OF AN EXPLORATORY
WELL CONSTRUCTION AND TESTING PERMIT HAS MADE A
TIMELY APPLICATION FOR AN INJECTION WELL OPERATING
PERMIT, DOES THE CONSTRUCTION AND TESTING PERMIT
CONTINUE IN EFFECT PAST ITS EXPIRATION DATE UNTIL
THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA217
TION HAS ACTED ON THE PENDING APPLICATION?
The Board of Commissioners of Brevard County had applied for an
exploratory well construction and testing permit for testing at the Indian
River. The County wanted to use the well for treated sewage disposal, with

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Davey Compressor Co., 639 So. 2d at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
642 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1994).
10 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1584-85; 642 So. 2d at 1081-82.
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a plan to inject the treated sewage underground. The County later filed a
timely application for an operating permit. While the application was
pending approval, the County was given verbal approval to begin using the
well for sewage disposal. The Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation
challenged such use in federal court, arguing the County was operating the
well without having been formally granted the operating permit. The
County argued that its timely application for the operating permit operated
to continue its now expired permit for construction and testing, and that this
28
permit allows for operation incident to testing.
The Supreme Court of Florida held that such renewal of the construction and testing permit would only be valid for construction and testing, and
not for a new and different function, which is operation. The two types of
permits are different for a reason, and the applicable law, section 120.60(6)
of the Florida Statutes, as well as FloridaAdministrative Code, section
17-4.090(1), cannot be construed to extend the expiration date of a
construction and testing permit when an application for an operating permit
has been submitted.2 19
XI. EQUITY
Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enterprises.' Nachon filed an action in
county court to foreclose a construction lien. The landowner filed an action
in circuit court challenging the county court's jurisdiction. The circuit court
discharged the lien on the theory that by statute lien foreclosure actions must
be brought in circuit court.221 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed
and its opinion was affrmned by the Supreme Court of-Florida.22
It had long been established that a lien foreclosure is an action in
equity. Florida Statutes, section 34.01(4), provides that: "[j]udges of
county courts may hear all matters in equity involved in any case within the
jurisdictional amount of the county court, except as otherwise restricted by
the State Constitution or the laws of Florida."'
Under this section, it
appears that the lien foreclosure was properly commenced in county court
if the amount did not exceed the jurisdictional amount. However, Florida

218. Legal EnvtL Assistance Found., Inc., 642 So. 2d at 1082.
219. Id. at 1084.
220. 615 So. 2d 245 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla.
1993), and decision approved, 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
221. Id. at 862-63.
222. Id. at 247.
223. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(4) (1993).
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Statutes, section 26.012(2)(g), provides that circuit courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction "[i]n all actions involving the title and boundaries of
real property. ' 'z The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that foreclosure of a lien on real estate did involve the title and, therefore, fit within this
exclusive jurisdiction.2 25 So there appeared to be a conflict in the statutes
for which the constitution did not provide a solution.
The supreme court looked to the legislative history and invoked the
plain meaning approach to statutory construction, but it solved the dilemma
by holding that the 1990 amendment to section 34.01(4) impliedly amended
the inconsistent provisions of the earlier statute, section 26.012. The court
concluded that, "the legislature intended to provide concurrent equity
jurisdiction in circuit and county courts, except that equity cases filed in
county courts must fall within the county court's monetary jurisdiction, as
set by statute. 2 26 It went on to decide that satisfaction of the monetary
limits would be determined in a lien foreclosure by reference to the debt,
not the value of the property subject to the lien.
Justice Shaw, considering the unsigned majority opinion227 to be
"badly flawed in parts," 228 wrote an opinion concurring in the result, but
challenging the conclusion that a lien foreclosure involves the "title and
boundaries" of real property as required by section 26.012(2)(g). 229 The
conjunction "and" convinced him that both title and boundaries must be the
subject of the action to fit within this section, but this lien foreclosure
involved only title. Consequently, he would have preferred the supreme
court to conclude that the lien foreclosure was properly filed in the county
court because there was no conflicting statute giving exclusive original
jurisdiction over this case to the circuit court.
The supreme court had thus finally settled the confusion over the
foreclosure jurisdiction of the county court. Subsequent buyers and title
insurers, who were in grave danger because they had a county court
foreclosure in their chain of title, can breathe a sigh of relief. The next
230 illustrates how this will be
case, Sea Breeze, Video, Inc. v. Federico,

224. Id. § 26.012(2)(g).
225. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 862.
226. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1) (Supp. 1990) (stating the necessary monetary
amounts).
227. Chief Justice Grimes, Senior Justice McDonald, and Justices Overton, Harding, and
Kogan concurred in the per curiam opinion. Justice Shaw concurred in the result only.
228. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 862.
229. Id.
230. 648 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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applied to an injunction action. Still unanswered, however, is how this
might translate into county court jurisdiction to hear quiet title actions.
Apparently the county court would have jurisdiction because such actions
would involve title or boundaries if the jurisdictional amount can be
determined. How that would be done remains uncertain. Furthermore, it is
worth noting that there is an Article V Task Force in existence which is
expected to issue a report in December of 1995, and may spur further
changes.
Sea Breeze, Video, Inc. v. Federico.23 ' Sea Breeze sued Pinellas
County in circuit court requesting a declaration that certain county
ordinances were invalid and an injunction against their enforcement. The
complaint alleged subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court based on
value of the business property exceeding $15,000. Sea Breeze sought
review by mandamus of the circuit court's sua sponte transfer of the action
to the county court. Although the petitioners conceded that county courts
now have equitable jurisdiction, they argued that the new concurrent
jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive relief. The respondents challenged
the basis for the amount in controversy.
The Second District Court of Appeal held that county courts can now
issue injunctions, under the reasoning of Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enterprises, Inc. 232 in which the supreme court held that the county and circuit
courts have concurrent jurisdiction in equity over lien foreclosures. The
district court stated that:
[t]he circuit court's exclusive jurisdiction is invoked by a good
faith allegation that the amount in controversy is within the jurisdictional amount. Where an action for declaratory and injunctive relief does
not reach the threshold jurisdictional amount of the circuit court, a
plaintiff may3 choose either court, each court having concurrent
jurisdiction. 3
Because the petitioners alleged the amount in controversy to be more than
$15,000, the action should not have been transferred.
The court did not specifically address the issue of whether the amount
in controversy in a declaratory and injunctive relief action is based on the
value of the property involved, as alleged by the petitioners. However, in
a footnote, the court did mention that federal diversity cases involving such

231. Id.
232. 641 So. 2d at 858.
233. Sea Breeze, Video, Inc., 648 So. 2d at 228 (citations omitted).
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relief have based amounts in controversy on the value of the right sought to
be protected, the value of the right to be free of the particular regulation, not
the entire value of the business.234
Koschler v. Dean.235 On March 1, 1966, a warranty deed dated
February 28, 1966 was recorded in the public records conveying the
property at issue to "William H. Dean and Mary Dean, his wife." William
and Mary were divorced at that time. On June 21, 1966, they remarried and
remained legally married until William's death in 1990, but they did not live
together. Only William lived on the property. Mary lived with another
man, acting and holding herself out to be his wife. After William died,
Mary and the man with whom she lived gave a mortgage to the Koschlers.
The person who conducted the title search concluded from the record that
title to the property vested in Mary as the surviving spouse of William.
Mary and her boyfriend executed an affidavit stating that no one else had
a legal or equitable interest in the property.
Meanwhile, unknown to the Koschlers, the personal representative of
her late husband had begun an adversary proceeding in the probate division
of the circuit court against Mary, challenging her interest in the property and
seeking a declaration that she was not entitled to participate in William's
estate as an heir. On the day before the closing of the mortgage transaction,
the personal representative filed a notice of lis pendens against the property
in the probate division of the circuit court. However, he did not record the
notice of lis pendens in the official county records after obtaining a judgment divesting Mary of any interest in this property.
The personal representative sought, obtained, and brought this quiet title
judgment against the mortgagees. The trial court held that the Koschlers
were not "bona fide mortgagees for value" because if they had searched in
the public records for the name of Mary's boyfriend, they would have found
an affidavit falsely claiming that Mary was married to her boyfriend. The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that this was not in the
chain title to this property and did not have any bearing on the title.236
The Koschlers were entitled to rely on the chain of title found in the official
records unless they had actual knowledge of an adverse unrecorded right.
The court stated that the fault lies with the personal representative for failing
to record the notice of lis pendens in the public records at the time he began
the litigation.2 37 Merely filing the documents in the probate division of
234. Id. at 228 n.4.
235. 642 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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the court does not constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers of
real property, so they take without constructive notice.
XII. FORECLOSURE
A.J. Stanton, Jr., P.A. v. Ivey.238 Stanton filed a mortgage foreclosure
action against Ivey based on a $10,000 note and mortgage executed by Ivey
in settlement of an attorney's fee dispute. Ivey had defaulted on the
mortgage payments but asserted the defense of unclean hands, contending
that he was not aware that Stanton had represented other clients with
interests conflicting with his, thereby breaching his fiduciary duty.239
The trial court submitted the equitable issue of unclean hands to the
jury. The Fifth District Court of Appeal saw this as a potential error,
although judges can sometimes use advisory juries for guidance in equitable
matters. However, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's judgment in favor of Ivey based on other grounds. The evidence to
support a finding of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Stanton was
sufficient to avoid enforcement of the mortgage. The mortgage and note
arose from a fee dispute regarding Stanton's representation of Ivey in a
divorce, and Stanton was unaware at the time he represented Ivey that those
other clients in question had conflicting interests from prior dealings with
240
Ivey.
A Mortgage Co. v. Bowman.2 4 This case involved the foreclosure
of a VA mortgage. The foreclosure sale was set for July 8, 1993, but could
not be held on that date because the bidding instructions could not be
obtained from the VA in time. Section 3701 of the United States Code, and
those that follow thereafter, require that bidding instructions be obtained
from the VA before a foreclosure sale can occur. Otherwise, the VA can
refuse to guarantee the loan. Because of the delay in issuing the instructions, the lender moved to reschedule the sale. The request was denied
without explanation. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that such
refusal was an abuse of discretion, and reversed and remanded.242
Amos Fowler & Amylene, Inc. v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n.243 Amylene, Inc. and its president, Mr. Fowler, appealed a final

238. 645 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
239. Id. at 1051.

240. Id.
241. 642 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
242. Id. at 124.
243. 643 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of First Federal. The appellants
executed a note and mortgage to the lender in 1977, for $275,000 at ten
percent interest. The purpose of the loan was to refinance a mortgage held
on a sixty-five unit motel complex. The lender later approved Fowler's plan
to convert the motel into a condominium, and Fowler began to sell the units
subject to the mortgage. In 1985, the appellants stopped paying the
mortgage, and the lender accelerated the loan and foreclosed. In July of
1985, the court appointed a receiver at the request of the lender.2"
In 1992, after a one-day trial, the trial court entered final judgment of
foreclosure in favor of the lender, in the amount of $606,449.51, well in
excess of the original loan amount. This amount included $233,345.97 in
unpaid principal, $243,556,84 in interest from December of 1984 until the
date of the judgment on a per diem basis, $17,140.14 in late charges,
$62,406.56 as costs, and $50,000 as attorney fees.245
The mortgage had a paragraph providing for interest to accrue on
expenses the lender incurs to protect its interest when the borrower fails to
perform the covenants and agreements contained in the mortgage. On
appeal, the court held that this provision in the mortgage justified the
disputed interest charges. 46 However, the appellate court reversed and
remanded on the award of interest because the per diem was based on 360
and not 365 days per year, and it was not clear whether it was based on
simple or compound interest. 47 Additionally, the court reversed the award
of late charges because it should not have included charges for each month
after acceleration.248 The lender is only entitled to late charges accrued
up until acceleration of the note. Similarly, the court reversed the $50,000
attorney fee award because it lacked competent, substantial evidence of both
the services performed and the reasonable value of such services.249
Apparently there was no transcript of the hearing on attorney fees.
Batchin v. Barnett Bank of Southwest Florida.zS Mr. Batchin was
the deceased mortgagor's heir. Barnett began foreclosure of the deceased's
mortgage and attempted to serve the decedent, apparently unaware that he
had died. Mr. Batchin advised the process server that his father, the
mortgagor, was deceased. The return of service stated this. The bank

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33.
Amos Fowler & Amylene, Inc., 643 So. 2d at 33.
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647 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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subsequently served Mr. Batchin with a notice of deposition, at which he
testified that he was the sole beneficiary under the decedent's will, and that
the will had not yet been probated.
Despite this and other communications between Mr. Batchin and the
bank through its attorneys, the bank's attorneys later attempted service by
publication, and changed the name of the defendant in the foreclosure from
the decedent to the decedent and all parties claiming interests by, through,
under or against the decedent. Notice was published, and when no one
responded, the court appointed a guardian ad litem, who filed an answer on
behalf of the decedent. Final summary judgment was entered, and the
property was sold to an individual.
Mr. Batchin then sought to enjoin the issuance of a certificate of title
to the property, seeking a declaration that he was the owner of the equity of
redemption, either as the heir under the will or under intestate succession.
The court initially granted a temporary injunction but later vacated it.25'
On appeal, the court held that service by publication was improper here
because there had not been a diligent search for interested parties, especially
since the same law firm had deposed the one interested party.252 Because
there had been no valid service of process, the foreclosure judgment was
entered without authority. The court mentioned but left unresolved whether
the judgment would be void or voidable.25 3 The court said such a determination would be relevant when determining the rights of the purchaser at
foreclosure sale.2" However, the court noted that the purchaser in this
case was not a bona fide purchaser because she had actual notice of Mr.
Batchin's claim to the property one day before the certificate of title was to
issue.2 55 The bank would have to reforeclose and personally serve Mr.
Batchin, or if unable to do so, file a more complete affidavit of diligent
search. 6
BSL Investors, II v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n.257 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal reversed a partial summary judgment entered in
favor of the lender, holding the individual general partners of BSL Investors
jointly and severally liable in the amount of $847,155.74.258 Downey

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
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Savings brought an action to foreclose the appellants' property, the Colony
Plaza Hotel. The lender moved for summary judgment, and a hearing was
set for October 7, 1993. On that date, in open court, the lender filed an
"Emergency Motion for Turnover of Property to Receiver," claiming that
BSL and its general partners had been siphoning the hotel "rents" during the
eighteen months since the foreclosure action was commenced. The trial
court entered summary judgment against BSL Investors and granted
Downey's Motion for Turnover of Property in the amount of $847,155.74.
Next, the court entered the disputed partial summary judgment holding the
general partners jointly and severally liable for that amount, and authorized
a writ of execution. 259
The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellants that the
partial summary judgment should not have been granted because the lender
never moved for such action and the procedure followed by the lender in
obtaining the judgment was "so thoroughly defective as to constitute a
denial of due process."" r
County Collection Services, Inc. v. Allen. 61 County Collection
Services brought a lien foreclosure action. However, the circuit court,
having first granted summary judgment for the Collection Service, ultimately
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the amount
in controversy to be within the county court's jurisdictional amount.262
The subject lien arose from the property owner Allen's violation of the
Palm Beach Zoning Code, resulting in a fine of $75 per day. The claim of
lien was recorded on March 12, 1990 after the fines totaled $9900. On
March 12, 1990, the jurisdictional amount in controversy limit for the
county courts was $5000.263 The relevant section of the FloridaStatutes,
section 34.01(1)(c), was amended in 1990 to provide for the increased
amount in controversy currently in place for the county courts. The
amended statute provides that the county court has subject matter jurisdiction "[a]s to causes of action accruing ... [o]n or after July 1, 1990 ... at
law in which the matter in controversy does not exceed the sum of $10,000,
exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney's fees, except those within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit courts." 2" The statute provides for a
further increase of subject matter jurisdiction for causes of action accruing

259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 650 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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on or after July 1, 1992, where the amount in controversy does not exceed
$15,000, the current jurisdictional limit of the county courts. 265
Because the jurisdictional limit was $5000 at the time that the claim of
lien was filed, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the $9900
action was clearly not within the county court's jurisdiction, and should not
have been dismissed by the circuit court.2 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal noted further that FloridaStatutes, section 162.09(3), provides for
continued accrual of the fine until judgment is rendered, so that the current
amount of the lien would be well within the circuit court's jurisdiction.2 67
The court made no mention of the provision in section 34.01(1)(b) of
the Florida Statutes which states that the county courts have original
jurisdiction "[o]f all violations of municipal and county ordinances.... ,268
This provision seems to support the circuit court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. This was, after all, an action based on the
violation of the Palm Beach County Zoning Code.
Although the action arose from violations of county ordinances, it was
a foreclosure action. Foreclosure actions are in equity, and equitable
jurisdiction was, at the time that the cause of action accrued, exclusively
within the circuit courts. This seems to support the Fourth District Court of
Appeal's holding that the action belonged in the circuit court, but the Fourth
District Court of Appeal made no mention of this. It seems as though the
court intentionally avoided any mention of equitable jurisdiction in its
opinion.269
It was as recent as September 9, 1994 that the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the county and circuit courts had concurrent jurisdiction in
equity, in a decision which involved the jurisdictional statutes as amended
effective October 1, 1990, after the cause of action had accrued in this
case 7 Therefore, the recent holding that the two courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, if applied retroactively, would have affected the disposition of
this action.
Dvorak v. First Family Bank. 1 First Family Bank foreclosed the
Dvorak's mortgage, but two hours before the commencement of the
foreclosure sale, the Dvorak's filed a Chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy.
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The bankruptcy was later converted to Chapter 7. Two years later, the
bankruptcy trustee conveyed the mortgaged property to the Bank for $6000,
the amount of equity that the Dvoraks had in the property. The bank then
filed a motion in state court to amend its prior foreclosure judgment,
requesting a new sale date and adding more attorney's fees and interest to
the judgment amount.
The issue was one of first impression: whether a bank which purchases
the mortgaged property from the debtor as part of the debtor's bankruptcy
liquidation can subsequently continue its former foreclosure action and add
the attorney's fees incurred due to the bankruptcy.272
The Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled en banc that attorney's fees for
work before the bankruptcy court must be sought in the bankruptcy action
against the appropriate fund being held in that court, as stated in title 11,
section 506(b), of the United States Code. Failure to collect the fees
through the bankruptcy action when the creditor's claim is oversecured, such
as when there is money available for payment of fees, results in waiver of
the fees. Because the claim was oversecured, the bank's failure to collect
the fees through the bankruptcy action was held to constitute a waiver of the
fees.273 The court, in a footnote, however, commented that in certain
circumstances, a state court has the power to award attorney's fees for a
bankruptcy action. 274
As footnote four mentions, it is also apparent that the bank, by
purchasing the property from the trustee, discharged the Dvoraks. 75 The
court stated that merger did not occur because of an anti-merger clause in
the deed from the trustee. However, the purchase operated as a deed in lieu
of foreclosure. Thus, the bank now owned the property subject to its own
mortgage. It could foreclose itself to eliminate junior lienors, but it could
not seek a deficiency against the original mortgagors.276
First Union National Bank of Florida v. Goodwin Beach Partnership.277 First Union appealed a denial of a deficiency judgment because
the trial court determined that the fair market value of the property exceeded
the judgment at the time of the foreclosure sale. The final judgment amount
was $4,986,487. First Union purchased the property at the foreclosure sale
for the nominal sum of $1000 and moved for entry of a deficiency
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judgment. While still in the deficiency proceedings, First Union sold the
property for $2.5 million. First Union used this sale amount, in addition to
the tax assessed value of $3,106,500 and an appraisal using the income
approach giving a value of $2.18 million, in support of its deficiency
278
argument.
Goodwin presented its own experts who arrived at values in the $5
million range using the comparable sales approach. The trial court declined
to award a deficiency judgment, and specifically rejected any consideration
of $124,953 in unpaid real estate taxes due as of the date of foreclosure sale,
on res judicata grounds. The judge ruled that the unpaid taxes should have
been included in the final judgment of foreclosure.2 79
The Fifth District Court of Appeal found this to be error.28 Res
judicata applies when there are two actions. Here, the deficiency was
sought by motion within the same foreclosure action. "Section 702.06,
Florida Statutes, authorizes entry of a deficiency decree, should a deficiency
exist, in all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages.""2
Therefore, the
delinquent taxes should have been considered
in
arriving
at
the fair market
82
value for determining the deficiency.
According to the lengthy dissent by Judge Sharp, this decision is in
conflict with Home v. Smith2 3 and Consales, N.V. v. Sunshine State
Mortgage Co.2
Judge Sharp argued that even though claiming the
unpaid taxes as part of the deficiency decree might not be barred by res
judicata because the deficiency was sought within the same action, it should
be barred because it was sought after the mortgagee became the owner of
the property at the foreclosure sale. This proposition seems to be supported
by the doctrine of merger and the Statute of Quia Emptores. First Union
could have amended its foreclosure judgment to include the delinquent
taxes, but failed to do so.285
Ginsberg v. Lennar Florida Holdings, Inc.2 6 Appellant Ginsberg is
the owner and operator of a property management firm. He is also the
general partner of two limited partnerships which own apartment complexes
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located in Broward County, Florida. The apartment complexes were
managed by the appellant's property management firm. In 1988 both of the
partnerships gave mortgages on the apartment complexes to Amerifirst. In
1991, the Resolution Trust Company ("RTC") acquired the mortgages as
part of the liquidation of Amerifirst.
The appellees purchased the appellant's mortgages from the RTC after
the RTC had already commenced foreclosure proceedings against the
appellant, who had defaulted. Lennar subsequently obtained a foreclosure
judgment and scheduled a foreclosure sale for January of 1993. The sale
was stayed after the two limited partnerships sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In March of 1993, Lennar filed a five-count complaint against
Ginsberg. The counts consisted of conversion, waste, civil theft, violation
of Florida's RICO statute, and violation of section 772.103(4) of the Florida
Statutes, a conspiracy count. The counts related to Ginsberg and his
management company's wrongful diversion of rents to Ginsberg's personal
use. The loan documents gave Lennar a right to the rents from the
apartment buildings. Ginsberg used delay tactics in responding to the
complaint, and Lennar finally obtained a default judgment in August of
1993, after four tries. In January of 1994, Ginsberg moved to vacate the
default judgment, arguing excusable neglect. The motion was denied and
Ginsberg appealed.8 7
The Third District Court of Appeal rejected the excusable neglect
argument, but vacated the default judgment on other grounds. 8 The
court held that the complaint failed to set forth a viable cause of action and
could not support a judgment even by default.28 9 The reason for this was
that the relationship between the parties was explicitly expressed in the loan
documents, making the claims purely contractual in nature: "breach of
contractual terms may not form the basis for a claim in tort. Where
damages sought in tort are the same as those for breach of contract a
plaintiff may not circumvent the contractual relationship by bringing an
action in tort."29 The court cited cases supporting the principle that
purely economic losses are not recoverable in tort. This negated any claim
for conversion, civil theft, and RICO. Lennar could not sue for waste
because "[w]here the cause of action arises out of an injury to property, that
action is personal to the owner of the property and a party who subsequently
287. Id. at 493.
288. Id. at 502.
289. Id. at 494.
290 Id.
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takes title to the property, without receiving an assignment of that cause of
action, may not pursue that cause of action. '29' The assignment of
mortgage was silent regarding any waste cause of action held by the RTC.
Furthermore, waste is a valid cause of action only when the property is
rendered less valuable than the outstanding debt. There was no evidence of
such impairment of security. 2 2
Additionally, the court held that section 697.07, the assignment of rents
provision, applies retroactively to the date of default.293 The court,
however, disagreed with Lennar's claim that under 697.07(3) the parties
have the power to contract away their right to a written demand for the
rents.294 According to the court, a written demand for the rents is still a
prerequisite. Furthermore, section 697.07 creates a lien for the rents after
the written demand is made; the lien must be foreclosed before any right to
possession of the rents arises. Therefore, Lennar had no right to the rents
immediately upon default. The only action Lennar had the immediate right
to bring was to pursue its remedies under the loan documents. Because
Lennar had no possessory right to the rents, Ginsberg, the rightful possessor,
could not steal them. Therefore, the theft, RICO, and conspiracy counts
failed.295
Levine v. FDIC.296 The Levines appealed a circuit court judgment
holding that the FDIC, under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), could repudiate the deed in lieu of
foreclosure agreement entered into by the Levines and their now insolvent
and liquidated lender, First American Bank & Trust. The deed in lieu
agreement covering three properties was very beneficial to the Levines. It
allowed them to set the minimum prices for the lender's sale of the
properties and provided that the Levines would potentially receive $500,000
from the sales proceeds of the three properties. The agreement also allowed
the Levines to live rent free in one of the properties until sold. In May of
1988, First American sold two of the lots but refused to pay the Levines
their share of the proceeds as agreed to in the deed in lieu agreement. The
2
Levines sued.
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First American was declared insolvent on December 15, 1989 and the
FDIC was appointed receiver. The FDIC then notified the Levines that it
was repudiating the 1987 agreement pursuant to section 1821(e) of FIRREA.
The circuit court held that the repudiation provision, which became effective
on August 9, 1989, nearly a year and a half after the deed in lieu agreement
was executed, applied retroactively. This was the issue upon which the
Levines based their appeal.298
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute
did not apply retroactively. 299 The court noted the tension between the
two possible approaches, one being the presumption against retroactivity,
and the other being the maxim that courts must apply the law in effect when
a decision is rendered.3" The decision was based on the Supreme Court
of the United States' recent clarification of the conflict in Landgrafv. USI
Filn Products.30 1 In Landgraf, the Court provided an analytical framework for determining whether a federal statute can be applied retroactively.
First, the statute's legislative history is analyzed to determine whether
Congress has stated the proper scope of application. If not, the statute must
be analyzed to determine whether it will have "genuinely retroactive effect,"
such as impairing rights possessed when the party acted, increasing liability
for past acts, or imposing new duties with regard to completed transactions.
If so, a presumption against retroactivity applies.
In this case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal applied the above
analysis, finding no congressional statement of the statute's proper scope,
and then finding that the statute did have truly retroactive effect because it
impaired the Levine's contract rights. Therefore, the court held that the
presumption against retroactive effect applied.3"
Morgan v. Kelly.30 3 Morgan appealed a post-foreclosure deficiency
judgment, claiming the trial court erred in entering a judgment for less than
the amount due. Morgan was the foreclosing mortgagee, and obtained a
foreclosure judgment of $387,087.28. He purchased the property at sale for
$100,000. The court determined fair market value to be $215,000. The trial
court determined the deficiency by subtracting the sales price from the fair
market value, arriving at the judgment amount of $115,000. The Third
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District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial3 court applied an
incorrect formula for arriving at the deficiency judgment. 0
The correct formula for determining a deficiency judgment is the total
debt, as secured by the final judgment of foreclosure (here, $387,087.28)
minus the fair market value of the property as determined by the court.3 5
Although the court has discretion in determining deficiency judgments, a
departure from the above formula must be supported by a statement of legal
or equitable justification. Otherwise, it is an abuse of discretion."°
Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n v. Brooks.3 1 This case involved
the foreclosure of a condominium association's lien for unpaid association
dues. The lien amount was under $15,000 and the action was originally
brought in the circuit court. The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed,
holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that the
county court had exclusive jurisdiction in equity to hear the foreclosure."
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Third District Court of Appeal's
decision based on the recent holding in Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon3°9 that
the county and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction in equity.
XIII. HISTORIC PRESERVATION
Metropolitan Dade County v. P.J. Birds, Inc.3" Metro-Dade petitioned for a writ of certiorari to quash the circuit court's order which
overturned the designation of part of Parrot Jungle in Miami as a historic
site. The County, by local ordinance in 1990, declared a twelve-acre portion
of Parrot Jungle a historic site because the property had achieved exceptional significance for over fifty years. The ordinance provides that generally
properties must achieve significance during a period of over fifty years in
order to be considered historic sites. This is known as the over fifty rule.
Parrot Jungle qualified through the above described rule as well as through
the exceptional significance exception which allowed a property to be
considered if it has not been significant for over fifty years, but its
significance has been exceptional. The County used this dual rationale
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because it was uncertain as to which justification was necessary because the
property had been in existence for over fifty years but significant structures
had been built within the last fifty years. 1
The owner of Parrot Jungle contested the County's determination,
arguing that the standard of "exceptional importance" was undefined and
that his procedural due process rights were violated.312 The court disagreed, overlooking the fact that the County had based its designation on
both alternatives (the over fifty rule and the under fifty exception) so that
a lack of clarity in the "exceptional importance" standard would not be
dispositive." 3 Furthermore, the standard was not vague because there
were prior administrative law cases setting out recognized professional
criteria for interpreting "exceptional importance." Besides, it is a determination which must be made on a case-by-case basis.3" 4 Judge Barkdull
dissented, arguing that the court should have denied review.3 15
XIV. HOMESTEAD
King v. Ellison.316 The Supreme Court of Florida answered the
following certified question in the negative:
WHETHER SECTION 732.401(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1991),
WHICH VESTS A REMAINDER INTEREST IN HOMESTEAD
PROPERTY IN LINEAL DESCENDANTS, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL WHEN APPLIED TO DEFEAT A TESTATOR'S INTENT TO
DEVISE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY EQUALLY TO ADULT
STEPCHILDREN AS WELL AS ADULT LINEAL DESCEN317
DANTS?
In so doing, the court found no conflict between section 732.401(1) and
318
article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution.
Florence and Hubert Calhoun, a married couple each with children
from prior marriages, purchased property in Indian River County. They
both drew up their own wills, in which they bequeathed their entire estates

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 178.
P.J. Birds, 654 So. 2d at 181 (Barkdull, J., dissenting).
648 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 667.
Id. at 668.
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to each other. The wills each contained a provision that the one who lived
longest would pass his property to the children and stepchildren. When
Florence died, Hubert married Rosemarie, establishing homestead in the
Indian River property. Hubert died two years later, leaving Rosemary as the
surviving spouse. Because there was a surviving spouse and a homestead,
and because article X, section 4(c), of the constitution does not allow
homestead to be devised when the owner is survived by a spouse, the devise
in the will was invalid. Section 732.401(1) governs the requirement that the
surviving spouse receive a life estate in the homestead with a vested
remainder going to the decedent's lineal descendants. In response to the
stepchildren's claim that the statute constitutes an improper and unconstitutional restraint on alienation, the court responded that the statute does not
restrict the right to devise homestead property, but merely states how
homestead property will descend if it is not devised as permitted by the
Florida Statutes or the constitution.319 The constitutional provision
restricts the right to devise homestead.3 20
" ' The school obtained a money
Miami Country Day School v. Bakst.32
judgment against the Baksts for failure to pay tuition, and sought to enforce
the judgment against the Baksts' residence, a houseboat. The trial court
held that the houseboat qualified as homestead pursuant to article X, section
4, of the Florida Constitution, and section 222.05 of the Florida Statutes.2
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.3"
The court
restated that the homestead provision is to be broadly construed as a matter
of public policy. Thus, a "dwelling house," as used (but not defined) in
section 222.05, is now extended past the inclusion of mobile homes to
houseboats.324
XV. INSURANCE
Preferred Mutual Insurance Co. v. Martinez." Preferred issued a
homeowner's policy to the Martinezes who subsequently filed a claim after
Hurricane Andrew. The parties disagreed on the amount of the claim, and
the Martinezes sued, arguing that Preferred failed to offer them the full
319.
320.
321.
1995).
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.
Id.
641 So. 2d467 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 469.
643 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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replacement value of their home. The policy stated that in the event of such
a dispute, either party could demand an appraisal. The insurance company
made such demand, but the trial court denied it, holding that the insurance
company had waived this right by not demanding appraisal earlier in the
negotiations. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for
entry of an order compelling appraisal.326 The court held that such
appraisal provisions, like arbitration clauses, are deemed to be conditions
precedent to recovery under the insurance policies.327
XVI. LAND USE PLANNING
Equity Resources, Inc. v. County of Leon. 328 Leon County adopted
an ordinance to insure that property owners' vested rights would not be lost
by operation of the County's adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Land Use
Plan. Equity resources owned forty-seven acres: ten acres had already been
developed; on thirty acres, permits for development had been issued and
construction of multifamily housing had begun when the permits were
revoked due to down-zoning; 329 and the remaining land was zoned
commercial. Equity Resources and Richard Pelham, Equity's president and
one of its co-owners, applied for a determination that their development
rights had vested; however, the application was denied. Equity Resources
then petitioned the circuit court for certiorari which was also denied. The
First District Court granted certiorari and, in an extensive and well-reasoned
opinion written by Chief Judge Zehmer,330 the decision of the trial court
was quashed.
The focus of the opinion was on "whether the trial court observed the
essential requirements of the law in ruling on the petition. '331 The
ordinance, recognized equitable estoppel as a basis for granting a vested
rights determination. Equitable estoppel based upon the actions of a zoning
authority has the following elements: 1) a property owner's good faith
reliance, 2) on some act or omission of the government, and 3) a substantial
change in position or the incurring of excessive obligations and expenses so

326. Id. at 1103.
327. Id.
328. 643 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1194
(Fla. 1995).
329. Note that the down-zoning occured prior to the adoption of the plan. This has led
to litigation in federal court. See Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Lake County, 796 F. Supp.
1477 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
330. Judge Miner and Senior Judge Smith concurred.
331. Equity Resources, Inc., 643 So. 2d at 1117.
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that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he
acquired.3 32 The trial court erred by confusing these elements with the
requirements of standing. The trial court had concluded that Equity
Resources lacked standing because Pelham, not Equity Resources, was the
one who had relied upon the government's position. Further, Pelham lacked
standing because Equity Resources was now the owner. Pelham, as an
indirect owner of the property, did have standing. Equity Resources, as a
vehicle created and controlled by Pelham to invoke estoppel based upon
Pelham's acts of reliance which a stranger successor would not.
The trial court had also ruled against the petitioners because "'there is
no evidence they incurred expenses exclusively for the undeveloped portion
of the property, because the expenditures were not made in reliance on any
promise by the County and because the [Petitioners] waited far too long to
complete the project.' ' '333 The district court found that there was "no basis
in law for this ruling."3 ' There is no requirement that the claimant have
incurred expenses exclusively for one particular piece of land; there is no
requirement that the County have made any promise; and there is no
requirement that development have been commenced within any particular
time or a reasonable time.335 The case was remanded to the trial court
with directions to order the County to give further consideration to the
original application in a manner consistent with the opinion.
City of Jacksonville v. Wynn. 3 6 Wynn and other property owners in
a Jacksonville residential subdivision sued seeking a declaration that the
City's comprehensive zoning plan was invalid as applied to their property.
They also sought an injunction to prevent the City from imposing on their
property any use classifications more restrictive than "neighborhood
commercial," and claimed inverse condemnation.
The reason behind the property owners' opposition to the City's plan
was that their six residential lots, five improved with single-family homes
and one vacant lot, were zoned as "residential low density" in the City's
plan. The property owners claimed that their lots had gradually become less
conducive to residential use and that the best use for the property was now
neighborhood commercial. The City refused to change its plan and the
property owners argued that the zoning of their properties under the plan did

332.
1st Dist.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. (quoting Franklin County v. Leisure Properties, Ltd., 430 So. 2d 475, 479 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1975), review denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983)).
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id.
650 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare, and was thus an invalid exercise of police power. The circuit court
held that the plan failed to meet the requirements of chapter 163 of the
Florida Statutes. It entered judgment in the property owners' favor with
regard to all their claims except inverse condemnation, finding that the
injunctive relief would prevent a taking from occurring. The First District
Court of Appeal, in an opinion written by Judge Kahn, 337 reversed on two
grounds.
First, the court determined that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the action. 33 Part II of chapter 163 of the Florida
Statutes provides that an administrative hearing before the Division of
Administrative Hearings is the sole method available for the determination
of whether a local government's plan is in compliance with chapter 163.
The Division of Administrative Hearings has exclusive original jurisdiction
over such challenges. 3 ' Even before such hearing is requested, the
Department of Community Affairs must make an initial determination as to
whether the plan is in compliance. This means that the circuit courts have
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Division of Administrative
Hearings regarding the disputed plan, but cannot hear claims such as those
made in the instant case which bypassed the administrative remedy. 4
The court explained that the rationale behind depriving circuit courts of
subject matter jurisdiction to determine the validity of comprehensive plans
is to prevent piecemeal changes to comprehensive plans from resulting, in
effect, in spot zoning.342 The legislature has decided that the administrative agency is better equipped to analyze the impact that individual changes
might have on the overall plan.
The second basis for reversal was lack of ripeness. The landowners
here did not know what uses the government might permit on their
properties and they never submitted a development plan for the government
to accept or reject. They never received a final determination of the
permissible uses. It does not appear that a claim was made that such an
attempt would be futile, and there does not seem to have been any basis for
such a claim. Therefore, their taking claim was not ripe.

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Judges Ervin and Wolf concurred.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id.
Wynn, 650 So. 2d at 185.
Id.

1995]

Brown / Grohman/ Valcarcel

Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal.343 Blumenthal wanted to
have his twenty-acre parcel to RU-4L (Residential Limited Apartment House
with a maximum of twenty-three units per acre) rezoned so he could build
a 360-unit apartment complex. The planned development would have
eighteen units per acre. Nevertheless, a neighboring federation of homeowner associations objected, claiming that a trend had begun in the area to limit
density to thirteen units per acre. The County Commission denied the
rezoning application, agreeing that there was an emerging trend to limit
density in the area and that the current application was inconsistent with that
trend. Blumenthal successfully petitioned the circuit court for a writ of
certiorari. The circuit court held that, the Commission lacked substantial
competent evidence because the neighbor's testimony was conclusory and
lacked adequate support. The County then sought review by a petition for
a writ of certiorari to the district court.
The Third District Court of Appeal denied the writ. The court
noted3" that the standard of review is narrow in such cases and the district
court should determine two things: whether procedural due process was
afforded, and whether the circuit court applied the correct law. Procedural
due process was not raised as an issue and the district court ruled that the
circuit court had applied the correct law. It refused to reconsider the
question of whether the commissioner presented substantial competent
evidence because to do so would be to exceed the proper scope of review.
Judge Cope wrote a lengthy dissent to the effect that the circuit court
had applied incorrect law which may be characterized as follows. First, the
circuit court reviewed the remarks of an individual commissioner. The
circuit court should have determined whether the Commission's resolution
was based upon substantial competent evidence rather than on whether the
comments of an individual commissioner were based upon such evidence.
Second, based upon the facts in this record, the Commission had a choice
of alternatives. The fact that the circuit court would not have made the
same choice should not have been the question because there was sufficient
evidence in the record to support the choice that the Commission made.
Third, the circuit court's denigrating characterization of the testimony was
unwarranted. The court noted that, "[t]he citizen testimony in this case was
fact-based, and perfectly proper. In reality, there was no dispute as to the
material facts of the case in any event." 345 Fourth, the majority has
applied the scope of review for administrative decisions, rather than the
343. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1445 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 1995).
344. Judges Hubbart and Goderich concurred in the per curiam opinion.
345. Blumenthal, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D1449.
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review which a district court may exercise over a circuit court decision. The
district court may determine whether the law has been correctly applied to
the facts in the record. Fifth, the majority has made a factual error about
the record.346
City of Punta Gorda v. Burnt Store Hotel.347 The City appealed an
order determining that a capacity increase fee was actually an illegal tax.
The issue arose from a utility contract between the City and Burnt Store,
which had purchased an existing hotel already connected to the City's water
and sewer system. As a new utility customer, Burnt Store was required to
sign an agreement to pay for increases in average consumption. Due to
increased consumption, Burnt Store was charged $154,000. The City argued
that the costs of increased consumption should be charged to the party
responsible for the increased consumption. Burnt Store argued that because
the newly acquired property had not been changed structurally and had
existed in the same capacity under prior ownership, there was no new
increase for which the City had not previously accounted.
The district court affirmed3 48 the lower court's ruling that this was an
illegal tax. It stated that impact fees are justified when there is a nexus
between new construction and a population increase which leads to
increased consumption. This affects the infrastructure and requires an
additional capital expenditure.349 A change in the ownership of an
existing business does not provide the required nexus even though the
continuation of the business results in increased usage. In dicta, the court
reaffirmed the proposition that structural changes alone are insufficient to
justify an impact fee when there is no showing of additional usage.350
Sarasota County v. Webber.35' Webber sought a variance so he could
build a home within the protected Gulf Beach Setback Line. The Board of
County Commissioners initially approved the variance by a 3-2 vote.

346. The majority stated that a citizen had testified about a trend and that the
Commission had based its decision on the existence of that trend even though the citizen was
not an expert qualified to testify about such trends. However, the only time the word "trend"
appears in the record is in the remarks of a County Commissioner at the conclusion of the
hearing. The resolution made no mention of any such trend as being the basis for the
Commission's decision.
347. 639 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
348. Judge Blue wrote the opinion. Acting Chief Judge Schoonover and Judge
Threadgill concurred. Id.
349. Id. at 680.
350. See City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon Springs Arcade Ltd., 585 So. 2d 324 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 593 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1991).
351. 658 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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However, after a recess, one commissioner claimed a mental lapse and
moved to reopen the matter. The Board voted again and, this time, denied
the variance. Webber, claiming a violation of Florida's Government in the
Sunshine Law and a denial of procedural due process, sought certiorari
review in the circuit court which reversed the board. The Board and the
County brought this petition for a writ of certiorari in the district court
which held that the circuit court had erred by failing to determine whether
the Board's denial of the variance was supported by substantial, competent
evidence. Furthermore, the circuit court had applied the incorrect law in
assigning error to the Board's reconsidering a matter after having voted.
The Board properly followed the requirements of parliamentary procedure352 and satisfied the requirements of procedural due process. The
district court found no evidence in the record of any violation of the
Government in Sunshine Law.
3299 N. FederalHighway, Inc. v. Broward County.353 This case was
primarily a First Amendment case dealing with the free speech issue of
regulating nude dancing, but one novel issue relating to real property law
was unsuccessfully raised. The bar argued that the Broward County Adult
Entertainment Code, because it affected land use within the meaning of
section 125.66 of the FloridaStatutes, was subject to the zoning and land
use ordinance requirements of notice and public hearings.3" The Fourth
District .Court of Appeal held355 that the legislature intended to impose
those requirements only when an ordinance's effect on land use might be
substantial, meaning that it must be more than merely an incidental effect
on the use of land.356 Ordinances which require minimum distances
between residential areas and liquor establishments, or set moratoria on
building, or prohibit the keeping of horses, do affect the use of land. On the
other hand, ordinances which change building codes are not considered to
affect land use because their effect is incidental.357
In this case, the county ordinance sets a minimum distance between the
audience and nude performers. The court held that this is a regulation of
352. The motion to reconsider was made by a member of the original majority and only
a short time had passed between the votes. The applicant's attorney was still present in the
hearing room when the announcement was made. Apparently, there was no further

discussion or testimony. I
353. 646 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
354. Id. at 222.
355. Judges Glickstein and Warner concurred in the per curiam opinion. Judge Gunther
concurred specially without opinion.
356. Id. at 224.
357. Id.
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conduct, not land use, although it may necessitate some structural changes
in the interior of the buildings. Regulation of land use was not the primary
goal of the ordinance. Any such effect was incidental and not sufficient to
trigger the notice and hearing requirements. 58
The bar filed a motion for rehearing which the district court denied, but
the court35 9 certified the following question as being of great public
importance:
IS AN ORDINANCE THAT REQUIRES MODIFICATIONS TO
ONLY THE INTERIOR STRUCTURE OF A BUILDING AN
ORDINANCE THAT "AFFECTS THE USE OF LAND" WITHIN
THE
6
MEANING OF SECTION 125.66, FLORIDA STATUTES?
Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act.3 61 This
act, which becomes effective October 1, 1995, provides, "(3) Any owner
who believes that a development order ... or an enforcement action of a
governmental entity, is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the use of his real
property, may apply within 30 days after receipt of the order or notice of the
governmental action for relief under this section. 3 62 The relief cited
consists of a hearing before a special master 3 63 or, for a landowner who
has been denied an application for an amendment to a comprehensive plan,
mediation or other alternative dispute resolution.
The Florida Legislature also amended section 177.142 of the Florida
Statutes,365 authorizing local governments to change the name of any
subdivision, street, plat or other name appearing on an official plat or map,
and even on any unofficial map or plat maintained by the clerk of the circuit
court, if it finds that the name constitutes an ethnic or racial slur.
XVII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Flanigan'sEnterprises,Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Naples.366 Flanigan's
subleased its bar and sold the bar's furnishing and liquor license to the
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

3299 N. FederalHighway, Inc., 646 So. 2d at 224.
Judges Glickstein, Gunther and Warner concurred in this per curiam opinion.
3299 N. FederalHighway, Inc., 646 So. 2d at 228.
Ch. 95-181, § 2, Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1311, 1315 (West).
Id. at 1316.
Id. § 2 (5)-(29).

364. Id. § 4 (amending FLA. STAT.

§

163.3181).

365. Ch. 95-176, § 2, Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1305, 1305 (West).
366. 639 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1994).
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subtenant. Under the sublease, Flanigan's had a security interest in the
liquor license. The subtenant later granted a security interest in the liquor
license to Barnett Bank. Barnett Bank recorded, but Flanigan's did not.
Therefore, Flanigan's apparently could not claim priority based upon the
security interest. Flanigan's advanced a different theory. It claimed to have
a statutory landlord's lien,367 which was prior to Barnett's security interest
and, therefore, the subtenant's sale of the license gave rise to a statutory
action for damages for disposing of personal property that was under a
lien. 68
The Supreme Court of Florida, in an opinion written by Justice Shaw,
rejected this claim. The court had recently held a liquor license was not
personal property to which a landlord's lien could attach. 69 Although the
liquor license was represented by a certificate which the licensee was
required to locate on the property, the certificate was not the license.
Lacking a lien on the property, the damage theory was fatally defective.
American Linens, Inc. v. Venmall International Group.370 The
landlord brought an action for breach of the lease. The trial court found that
the tenant owed $5325 in back rent and taxes, but that it was otherwise
entitled to a return of its $12,834 security deposit. The tenant appealed,
inter alia, the denial of prejudgment interest on the security deposit. The
Third District Court of Appeal reversed on this point,371 holding that interest should have been awarded from the date that the tenant demanded the
return of its security deposit because the claim for $7509 was a liquidated
contractual claim which became due upon demand.

367. Id. at 618.
Landlord's lien for rent. Every person to whom rent may be due, his heirs,
executors, administrators or assigns, shall have a lien for such rent upon the
property found upon or off the premises leased or rented, and in the possession
of any person, as follows:
Upon all other property of the lessee or his sublessee or assigns, usually kept on
the premises. This lien shall be superior to any lien acquired subsequent to the
bringing of the property on the premises leased.
FLA. STAT.

§ 83.08 (1977).

368. Id. § 818.01.

369. Flanigan's,617 So. 2d at 618 (citing Walling Enters., Inc. v. Mathias, 636 So. 2d
1294 (Fla. 1994)).
370. 645 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
371. Id. at 1060. Judges Hubbart, Baskin, and Green concurred in the per curiam
opinion.
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Anderson v. Fiocchi. 72 The tenant cut his hands trying to open a
glass shower door in a leased mobile home. The shower door, which would
not open with ordinary pressure and was made of plain glass instead of
safety glass, as required by the building code. The door had been installed
before the current landlords purchased the property. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the landlords, holding that they were not liable
because they had no duty to determine what type of glass was in the door.
3 73
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed. Judge Blue's opinion
agreed with the trial court to a limited extent. If the sole basis for the claim
was based upon the glass used in the shower door, the plaintiff would lose.
However, the plaintiff testified in his deposition that he had complained
about the sticking door to the landlords' agent. The Supreme Court of
Florida has stated, "[a]fter the tenant takes possession, the landlord has a
continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous defective
conditions upon notice of their existence by the tenant, unless waived by the
tenant."374 There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
door was opening and closing properly, and whether the landlord was on
notice of its defective condition. Therefore, the motion for summary
judgment should not have been granted.
Lynch Austin Realty, Inc. v. Engler.3" The tenants apparently operated a consignment business. After defaulting on the lease, owing $45,000 in
unpaid rent, they removed $55,000 in inventory, fixtures, and equipment
regularly kept on the premises. The landlord brought an action for tortious
interference with a commercial landlord's lien, distress for unpaid rent, and
violation of the landlord's lien rights. The landlord also appealed a final
judgment in favor of the corporate tenant's guarantors.
The tenants claimed that more than half of the removed items had not
been paid for and were therefore subject to claims of their suppliers. The
trial court held that the suppliers' claims were superior to the landlord's, and
also absolved two of the four guarantors of liability. The Second District
Court of Appeal reversed on the issue of the suppliers' superior claims.
Under section 83.08(2) of the Florida Statutes, the landlord had a lien for
unpaid rent "upon all other property of the lessee or his sublessees or
'
assigns, usually kept on the premises. 376
The lien would attach either at

372. 640 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
373. Associate Judge Campbell and Judge Schoonover concurred.
374. Anderson, 646 So. 2d 276 (quoting Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1330
(Fla. 1981)).
375. 647 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
376. FLA. STAT. § 83.08(2) (1991).
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the time of the commencement of tenancy or when a chattel was brought on
the premises, whichever was later, and would be superior to a subsequently
created chattel lien. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code,3" the
landlord's lien would not have to be recorded to have priority over a
subsequently acquired security interest or lien. However, under the Uniform
Commercial Code,37 8 the suppliers must give some form of public notice
that they retained an interest in the goods. Since there was no evidence that
the suppliers had perfected their claim by giving notice, the landlord's lien
had priority.
Premici v. United Growth Properties, L.P.379 The shopping center
tenant stopped paying rent after a sewage system malfunctioned and
damaged the leased premises. The tenant sued the landlord for damages.
The landlord counterclaimed for eviction and back rent plus interest and
moved to bifurcate the actions in order to expedite its summary action for
possession. The trial court granted the landlord's motion.
The tenant asserted several defenses, including constructive eviction.
The landlord then filed a "Motion for Determination of Rent Due and
Payment of Rent Into Registry of Court," pursuant to the new procedure
established by section 83.232 of the FloridaStatutes. The court ordered the
tenant to pay $28,886.35 to the registry of the court. When the tenant did
not comply, the landlord moved for and won a default judgment on its
possession claim on the theory that the tenant's failure to pay the rent due
into the registry of the court constituted a waiver of all defenses. The
landlord then moved for entry of final judgment on the money damages
claim alleging that the default judgment for possession constituted an
admission by the tenant of all the landlord's allegations. The trial court
agreed and entered final judgment for damages.
The tenant appealed and the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.380 The court held, in the opinion written by Judge Griffin,38' that
the failure to make court-ordered rent payments into the court registry
waived all defenses only in the action for possession. The legislative history
revealed that the statute was intended to prevent commercial tenants from
having the benefits of continued possession during litigation without paying
rent. The court then utilized the purpose approach to overcome the
inadequate draftings found in this statute and concluded that the evil feared

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id. § 679.104(2).
Id. § 672.326(3).
648 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 1244.
Judges Cobb and Sharpe concurred.
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would be eliminated by applying this section only to the action for
possession.382 That interpretation would
be consistent with the interpreta38 3
tion of the similar residential statute.
Thor Bear, Inc. v. Crocker Mizner Park, Inc. 384 The tenant leased
space in a shopping complex for the purpose of operating a retail movie
video store. He paid $75,000 as a security deposit and spent about
$160,000 on improvements. The store failed a little more than a month after
it was occupied due to lack of business. The tenant blamed the problem on
inadequate parking and access. He had raised these issues with the lessor
during the lease negotiations and before occupying the building. However,
the lessor had repeatedly reassured him that his needs would be accommodated. The existence of a parking problem was well established, having,
inter alia, been the subject of newspaper coverage.
The tenant sued, claiming about $400,000 in losses and alleging
constructive eviction and fraudulent misrepresentation. The jury returned a
verdict for the tenant. However, the verdict was rejected by the trial court
which granted a belated directed verdict in favor of the lessors. The tenants
appealed.
The district court, in a per curiam opinion,3" 5 recognized that the
verdict should not have been set aside if a reasonable jury could have
reached that verdict. The court then set out the elements for fraudulent
misrepresentation:
(1) a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) the
representor's knowledge at the time the misrepresentation is made that
such statement is false; (3) such misrepresentation was intended to
induce another to act in reliance thereon; (4) action in justifiable
reliance on the representation; and (5)resulting damage or injury to the
36
party so acting. 1
The court then concluded that a reasonable jury could have concluded from
the evidence in the record that these elements were satisfied.387
The general rule of law is that the false statement of fact must concern
a past or existing fact to be actionable. But that rule is subject to an
382.
383.
1984).
384.
385.
386.
387.

Premici, 648 So. 2d at 1243.
See K.D. Lewis Enters. Corp. v. Smith, 445 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
648 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Judges Hersey, Glickstein and Klein concurred.
Thor Bear, 648 So. 2d at 172 (citations omitted).
Id.
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exception: a promise of future action made with no intention of performing
or with a positive intention not to perform is also actionable. In effect, the
fact which is the subject of the fraud is the promisor's intention. There was
testimony that the lessor's vice president told the tenant that additional
parking would be added when the leasing trailer was removed. However,
the vice president's successor told the tenant such additional parking was
never planned. A reasonable jury could infer from that evidence that the
landlord had made a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact.
In addition, the lessor's vice president made statements that the needs of the
tenant could be accommodated. Such an assertion made by one with
superior knowledge or who appeared to have superior knowledge could
constitute a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact rather
than merely an opinion. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could have decided
that the tenant's reliance on the vice president's assertions was reasonable
under the circumstances. Consequently, a directed verdict should not have
been granted.
Walgreen Co. v. Habitat Development Corp."' This case involved
a long-term commercial lease of the Walgreen building, a landmark in
downtown Miami. The landlord sought a declaration on the meaning of the
lease's surrender clause which required that the property be returned "in a
'safe condition and reasonably in good order and repair.""'3 9 The parties
and the trial court agreed that the phrase was clear and unambiguous and,
therefore, should have been given its plain meaning. However, then the trial
court construed that language to require the tenant to return the property "in
tenantable and rentable condition so that the premises are returned in reasonably like-new or nearly-new condition, safe and fit for immediate occupancy
and rental." 3" The Third District Court of Appeal reversed,39' holding
that the trial court had gone far beyond what the words expressed since
"reasonably good repair" did not imply like-new or nearly-new condition.3 9
Furthermore, the trial court held that to be in a safe condition, the
property would have to be in compliance with the building code at the time
of the surrender. 393 The district court held that the order would have to
be amended to provide, in essence, that the building not be in violation of

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

655 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 165 (quoting article 27 of the lease agreement).
Id.
Judges Hubbart, Levy and Goderich concurred in the per curiam opinion.
Id. at 165.
Id.
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the code, considering any exemptions or grandfathering-in which would be
applicable to the building.394
TCY, Ltd., Inc. v. Johnson.395 This circuit court decision merits
attention. The defendant rented a boat slip at the plaintiff's marina.
Alleging breach of the lease,396 the plaintiff filed a residential eviction
action in state court under chapter 83 of the FloridaStatutes. Among the
defenses was a challenge, which Circuit Court Judge Linda Singer Stein
rejected, to the court's jurisdiction based upon the theory that such an
eviction fell within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court.
For a contract to fall within admiralty jurisdiction, it must "relate to the ship
as an instrument of commerce."3'97 In this case, the defendant's boat was
moored to the dock, remained stationary, and was used exclusively as
defendant's residence. Thus, it had been withdrawn from commerce and an
action for possession of the slip where it was moored did not fall within
admiralty jurisdiction.
XVII. LEGISLATION
The Homebuyer's Protection Act398 broadens the protections provided
against unscrupulous contractors. The act provides that contractors must
now at all times, not merely in hurricane situations, apply for permits within
thirty days of receiving more than ten percent of the total contract price for
any construction work on residential properties. Additionally, for construction of completed homes, the deposit money must be placed in an escrow
account. All withdrawals from the escrow account require the signatures of
both the buyer and the contractor. The contractor must begin work within
ninety days from the issuance of permits unless the person ordering the
work agrees in writing to extend the period. A contractor who receives
payment in excess of the work already completed cannot fail to perform any
further work for any ninety-day period. The Act provides a procedure for
giving thirty-days notice to contractors when work has halted for sixty days.
Section 489.1265 of the Florida Statutes was amended to prohibit
contractors from allowing non-licensed persons to use the contractors'
394. Walgreen Co., 655 So. 2d at 165-66.
395. 3 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 72 (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995).
396. Plaintiff alleged breach of the lease by failing to comply with the marina's rules
and regulations and § 83.52 of the FloridaStatutes.
397. TCY, Ltd., Inc., 3 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 73 (quoting Pillsbury Flour Mills Co.
v. Interlake S.S. Co., 40 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1930)).
398. Ch. 95-240, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1688 (West).
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registration numbers. Such violations now constitute a first degree misdemeanor. Repeated violations constitute third degree felonies. Contractors
must notify homeowners in conspicuous writing, at the time that the homeowner makes initial payment to the contractor, that there is a recovery fund
for claims against contractors. The specific form to be used will be
prescribed by the Department of Legal Affairs and provided by the
Construction Industry Licensing Board by November 1, 1995.
One of the most important changes involves the homeowner's right to
obtain a list of all subcontractors and materials suppliers which the
contractor will use. This should prevent the general contractor from using
unlicensed subcontractors. A contractor's failure to supply such a list within
ten days after receipt of a proper request from the homeowner precludes the
contractor from asserting liens to the extent that the owner is prejudiced.
Furthermore, filing a fraudulent lien is now punishable as a third-degree
felony, as does intentionally or knowingly making false statements regarding
the payment of subcontractors and suppliers such that a person may rely on
the statements and draw payments.
39 9
The Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act,
which becomes effective as of October 1, 1995, is the most important act
relating to real property enacted so far in this legislative session. The act
provides remedies for real property owners whose property "has been
inordinately burdened by governmental action," which is defined in the act
as "an action [that] . . .has directly restricted or limited the use of real
property such that the property owner is permanently unable to attain the
reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real
property .... 40 The definition continues, emphasizing that the burden
must be permanent and disproportionate in comparison to the burden on
other properties. The act provides the procedures to be followed by
property owners in filing claims, allows settlements, and requires court
actions if a settlement agreement contravenes the application of state law.
Of course, it provides for attorney's fees and costs. It also provides a
mediation and dispute resolution mechanism for settling disputes regarding
amendments to comprehensive plans. The property owner must, not less
than 180 days prior to filing an action, present a written claim to the
governmental entity. During this 180-day period, the governmental entity
shall make a written offer of settlement, and must notify all contiguous

399. Ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1311 (West).
400. Id. § 1(3)(e), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1312.
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landowners of the pending claim. If the settlement offer is rejected by the
property owner, then suit can be filed in circuit court.
401
The, Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act,
which becomes effective October 1, 1995, provides:
(3) Any owner who believes that a development order . . . or an
enforcement action of a governmental entity[] is unreasonable or
unfairly burdens the use of his real property, may apply within 30 days
after receipt of the order or notice of governmental action for relief
under this section. 4°2
Relief consists of a hearing before a special master 403 or, for a landowner
who has been denied an application for an amendment to a comprehensive
plan, mediation or other alternative dispute resolution.'
The Florida Legislature also amended section 177.142 of the Florida
Statutes4 5 to authorize local governments to change the name of any
subdivision, street, plat or other name appearing on an official plat or map,
or even on any unofficial map or plat maintained by the clerk of the circuit
court if it finds that the name constitutes an ethnic or racial slur.
Chapter 95-274 made comprehensive changes to chapter 721 of the
Florida Statutes which deals with time-shares.'
The law also made
amendments to chapter 718 which deals with condominiums and expanded
the statutory regulation of homeowners' associations under chapter 617
which deals with corporations that are not for profit.
Among the more important changes dealing with time-shares was the
creation of new statute, section 721.065, which requires use of time-share
resale purchase agreements containing prescribed disclosures about
assessments for common expenses, penalties for non-payment, and a ten-day
cancellation provision.4 7 Also of note is a new section 721.071, dealing
with trade secret protection for developers' confidential materials filed in
conjunction with a public offering of a time-share plan.40 8 Section 721.15

401. Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1315.
402. Id.
403. Id. § 2(5)-(29), 1995 Fla Sess. Law Serv. at 1316-1320.
404. Ch. 95-181, § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1315 (West) (amending FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3181).
405. Ch. 95-176, § 2, 1995 Fa. Sess. Law Serv. 1305, 1305 (West).
406. Ch. 95-274, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1936 (West).
407. Id. § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1944.
408. Id. § 6, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1954 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
721.071).
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was amended to prohibit managing entities from commingling of operating
funds with reserve funds, or commingling of common expense funds of one
time-share plan with common expense funds of other time-share plans,
although such funds can be deposited into a common account for a period
not to exceed thirty days.
Chapter 95-274 included an amendment to section 721.20 prohibiting
real estate brokers and salespersons from collecting advance fees for listing
of time-shares.4 ' It amends section 721.26 to increase the regulatory
powers of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile
Homes, and increases the disclosure requirements for multi-state timeshares.4" Changes to chapter 718 of the FloridaStatutes include amendment of section 718.111(15) to prohibit condominium associations from
commingling of reserve and operating funds.41 2 Section 718.117 was
amended to enumerate the powers and duties of condominium directors after
commencement of termination proceedings.4 13
With regard to homeowners' associations, sections 617.301 through
617.312 were substantially amended, rewording the definitions and the
powers/duties sections, and specifying who may sue and be sued under
homeowners' association law.4 14 New statutory sections were created to
provide for arbitration and mediation of disputes between associations and
members and to provide for survival of association covenants after tax and
foreclosure sales.415 Additionally, section 689.26 was amended to include
a mandatory disclosure statement which must be provided to prospective
purchasers of real property subject to a homeowners' association membership requirement.4 16 The disclosure must be supplied by developers of
new homes as well as sellers in the resale market.4 17

409. Id. § 13, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1962 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
721.15(8)).
410. Id. § 14, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1963.
411. Ch. 95-274, § 15, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1963.
412. Id. § 35, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1983.
413. Id. § 47, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1993.
414. Id. §§ 52-62, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1997-2005.
415. Id. §§ 61-62, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2005.
416. Ch. 95-274, § 63, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2005-06.
417. Id.
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XIX. LIENS AND MECHANIC'S LIENS

Casa Linda Tile & Marble Installers, Inc. v. Highlands Place 1981,
Ltd. 18 The tile installer sued to enforce a mechanic's lien after it ceased
work due to nonpayment. The Highlands management counterclaimed for
defective work and for punitive damages due to Casa Linda's filing of a lis
pendens after the lien had been transferred to bond. Highlands alleged as
a defense to payment the condition precedent that the defects in the work,
as noted on a punchlist, be corrected. 19
The court ruled that "[w]hen a contractor has substantially performed
and otherwise complied with the mechanic's lien statute, it is entitled to an
award on its mechanic's lien claim for the contract price less all damages
caused by failure to render full performance."'42 Here, although the tile
installer failed to obtain the required architect's certificate of completion, the
court found substantial performance.42 ' As for the punitive damages for
filing a lis pendens after the lien was transferred to bond, the court ruled
that, absent a finding of actual malice, punitives are not justified, either by
statute or under a slander of title claim.422
Heidle v. S & S Drywall and Tile, Inc.4'2 Ms. Heidle appealed from
a denial of her recovery of attorney's fees from S & S Drywall, after a
$10,840 lien foreclosure action filed by S & S was dismissed for lack of
prosecution. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Ms.
Heidle was entitled to the attorney's fees under section 713.29, which allows
the prevailing party to recover such fees.42 4 There is no need to win on
a counterclaim to be considered a prevailing party. Ms. Heidle prevailed
because the action against her was dismissed.425
Hoepner & Assoc., Inc. v. Stewart Gilman Co. 426 The Fifth District

Court of Appeal affirmed the Orange County Circuit Court's dismissal of
Hoepner's action to foreclose a construction lien. Hoepner, a professional
engineering company, recorded its original claim of lien on August 27,
1991, and then recorded an amended claim of lien on September 24, 1991.
Hoepner filed suit to foreclose the lien on September 24, 1992, exactly one

418. 642 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

419. Id. at 767.
420. Id. at 768.
421. Id.
422. Casa Linda, 642 So. 2d at 768.
423. 639 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
424. Id. at 1106.

425. Id.
426. 648 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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year from the record date of its amended claim, but over one year from the
original claim date.427 The action was thus time barred under section
713.22(1) of the FloridaStatutes, which provides that no lien shall continue
for a longer period than one year after the claim of lien has been recorded
unless within that time an action to enforce the lien is commenced in a court
of competent jurisdiction. Recording an amended claim of lien does not toll
the one-year time period.4 2
The court cited Jack Stilson & Co. v. Caloosa Bayview Corp.429 in
support of its holding that, "although the lien statutes authorize a correction
or a change by way of an amendment to an original claim of lien, such
amendment does not toll the statutory time to institute suit. '430 The
rationale behind this interpretation is that the original and the amended claim
represent only one claim, which begins when first recorded.
Paulk v. Peyton.431 Appellant Paulk entered into a combination
written and oral contract with Peyton to perform certain improvements on
Peyton's real property. A dispute arose and Paulk instituted this action
seeking damages for breach of contract and foreclosure of a mechanic's lien.
Specifically, Paulk alleged that he furnished Peyton with a contractor's
affidavit stating that all lienors had been paid and that all conditions
precedent to the filing of the action had been satisfied. Peyton answered the
averment by stating that she was "without knowledge., 432 Later, Peyton
was granted summary judgment on the foreclosure claim because she was
not furnished with an original contractor's affidavit, but instead was given
a copy, which did not comply with the mechanic's lien statute, section
433
713.06(3)(d).
The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Peyton waived
her defense of nonperformance of this condition precedent by not pleading
it specifically and with particularity in her answer!'
Shipwatch Development Corp. v. Salmon.435 In a construction dispute
between Salmon, the contractor, and Shipwatch, the owner, the trial court
imposed a lien against Shipwatch's property in the amount of $16,024.07.
427. Id. at 854-55.
428. Id. at 855.
429. 278 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1973).
430. Hoepner, 648 So. 2d at 855 (citing Jack Stilson & Co. v. Caloosa Bayview Corp.,
278 So. 2d 282, 283-84 (Fla. 1973)).
431. 648 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
432. Id. at 773.
433. Id.

434. Id. at 774.
435. 646 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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The lien amount included amounts for Salmon's attorney's fees, as well as
prejudgment interest. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the
attorney's fees award because the trial court erred in not adjusting the
lodestar fee based on the extent of success achieved by counsel for
Salmon.4 36 The original amount alleged by Salmon to be due was over
437
$40,000.00, which indicates that the level of success was low.
The court also modified the award of prejudgment interest because it
erroneously included interest that accrued prior to the date the contractor's
affidavit was served. The trial court had granted prejudgment interest from
the date of filing the claim of lien, when the correct starting point is when
the contractor's affidavit is served.438
Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design, Inc. 4 39 The Supreme Court
of Florida answered the following certified question in the negative because
a binding contract is necessary in order to file a mechanic's lien:
DOES A SUBCONTRACTOR BEGIN TO FURNISH SERVICES,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIMELY PROVIDING A NOTICE TO
OWNER IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 713.06(2)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (1991), WHEN, WITHOUT ANY BINDING
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO DO SO, HE OR SHE BEGINS
TO SELECT MATERIALS AT SOME LOCATION OFF THE JOB
SITE, FOR FUTURE INSTALLATION ON THE JOB SITE? 4
The court also held that the forty-five-day period for giving notice to
the owner of a possible lien claim under section 713.06 of the Florida
Statutes, starts when a subcontractor begins to furnish services or materials
at the job site. 44
Gazebo Landscaping was the landscaping subcontractor of a general
contractor who was building a home on the Stunkel's property. Gazebo had
been orally contacted by the general contractor, and on November 7, 1990
took the Stunkels to select trees for the landscaping. The planting work at
the Stunkel property did not begin until December 5, 1990. The Stunkels
went bankrupt and Gazebo posted its notice of claim of lien on January 18,
1991. The issue was whether the forty-five-day period for posting a claim

436. Id. at 839.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S220 (May 11, 1995).
440. Id. at S221.

441. Id.
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of lien under section 713.06(2)(a) began to run on November 7 or December
5 of 1990. Fortunately for Gazebo, the court held that it began to run from
the later date, so that Gazebo was within the deadline. 2
Sturge v. LCS Development Corp. 3 The Sturges sought certiorari
review of an order denying their motion to discharge a mechanic's lien.
The lien arose from hurricane repairs done by LCS on the Sturges' property.
LCS recorded a claim of lien after the Sturges refused to pay due to the
quality of work and time delays. Subsequent to the filing of claim of lien,
the Sturges sued for breach of contract and included a count to discharge the
lien pursuant to section 713.21(4) of the FloridaStatutes. The clerk issued
a summons to show cause within twenty days why the lien should not be
discharged. On the twentieth day, LCS filed a motion to extend the
deadline to respond. After the twenty days had passed, the Sturges moved
to discharge the lien and the motion was denied. 4 "
The Third District Court of Appeal quashed the order and remanded
with instructions to discharge the lien." 5 The court restated that mechanic's lien laws are to be strictly construed. 4' Extensions of time to respond
pursuant to section 713.21(4) should only be granted for good cause, and
such good cause must be shown within the twenty day period. The447lien was
discharged due to LCS's failure to comply with this requirement.
Note that section 713.21(4) states that the circuit court of the county
where the property is located is the court empowered to discharge liens.
With the recent holding that county and circuit courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with regard to equitable actions, such as foreclosure of liens,
within the county court jurisdictional amount of $15,000, this statute should
probably be amended to state that the county courts can also discharge liens.
Although the lien in this case did not involve equity because it had not
reached the foreclosure stage, other mechanic's lien cases which reach
foreclosure could still involve claims for discharge. If these cases are being
heard in county court, the county court should be able to decide the related
discharge claims.

442. Id.
443. 643 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
444. Id. at 54.

445. Id. at 55.
446. Id. at 54.
447. Id. at 55.
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XX. Lis PENDENS
Acapulco Construction, Inc. v. Redavo Estates, Inc." The plaintiff,
Acapulco Construction, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review
of an order discharging their notice of lis pendens. The Third District Court
of Appeal treated the petition as an appeal from a non-final order dissolving
an injunction under rule 9.130(a)(3)(B) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure and reversed the trial court's order discharging the lis pendens." 9 The plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive trust on the subject
property, which was a viable claim entitling them to file a notice of lis
pendens. In an action such as imposing a constructive trust which
challenges the legal or equitable ownership of the property, a lis pendens is
necessary to protect both the parties and subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers. It was not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove their claim in order
to file a lis pendens; they only had to show a fair nexus between the
apparent legal or equitable ownership of the subject property and the dispute
involved in the lawsuit.450

Medical FacilitiesDevelopment, Inc. v. Little Arch Creek Properties,
Inc. 451 This case addresses the question of under what circumstances must
a bond be posted by the proponent of a lis pendens when the lis pendens is
not based upon a duly recorded instrument or construction lien. The Third
452
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's imposition of a bond.
The lis pendens was filed after Medical Facilities sued for specific
performance of an agreement in which it was to purchase a building from
Little Arch. Little Arch had entered into another contract to sell the
property to someone else for $6.5 million. Medical Facilities filed a lis
pendens preventing Little Arch from closing on the $6.5 million deal. Little
Arch moved to require Medical Facilities to post a bond to protect Little
Arch in the event that the lis pendens was later held to have been improperly filed. The trial court ordered Medical Facilities to post a $1 million
bond.453
The court referred to section 48.23 of the Florida Statutes, which
governs lis pendens. There are two types: those involving actions upon a
duly recorded instrument of construction lien, which do not require a bond;

448. 645 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
449. Id. at 183.
450. Id.

451. 656 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
452. Id. at 1303.
453. Id. at 1301-02.
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and those which are not founded on a duly recorded instrument or
construction lien, in which a bond might be required. This is controlled in
the same manner as the method by which the court grants and dissolves
injunctions. However, there are different approaches by the districts. Some
courts grant the bond if the owner of the property can show that it will
suffer irreparable harm if the lis pendens is unjustified. Others leave it to
the court's discretion. The third approach makes the posting of a bond
mandatory when the lis pendens is not founded upon a duly recorded
instrument. The Third District Court of Appeal follows the mandatory bond
approach. 4 4
The appellants referred to Chiusolo v. Kennedy,4' 5 in which the
Supreme Court of Florida stated, "[w]e agree... that the statutory reference
to injunctions exists merely to permit property holders to ask in an
appropriate case that the plaintiff post a bond where needed to protect the
former from irreparable harm. 45 6 The Third District Court of Appeal
stated that this was dicta and non-binding. 4 7 The lis pendens bond was
analogized to a temporary injunction bond, which can be obtained as of
right.4 8 Judge Green dissented, arguing that lis pendens bonds should not
be required unless the owner of the property would suffer irreparable harm.
Further, the court stated that monetary harm alone, which is the harm that
would have been caused by the lis pendens preventing the $6.5 million sale
of the building, is not irreparable because there was an adequate remedy at
law.

459

XXI. MARKETABLE RECORD TrILE AcT
Martin v. Town of Palm Beach.41 The 1948 deed to the County of
Palm Beach provided that the land be used for no other purpose than as a
public park, public beach, and recreational area. The County conveyed the
land to the Town of Palm Beach in 1957 by a deed which did not mention
the restriction, but did state that the conveyance was "subject to easements,
covenants, limitations, reservations and restrictions of record. 46 1 In 1964,
a shack on the property was converted into a fire station, which was
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

Id. at 1303.
614 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1993).
Id. at 492-93.
Medical FacilitiesDev., Inc., 656 So. 2d at 1303.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1307.
643 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 113.
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expanded in 1979. When the Town decided to replace the building with a
new fire station, a County resident brought this action for an injunction.462
The district court decided4 63 that the 1957 deed was the root of title
for the purposes of the Marketable Record Title Act ("MRTA"). 464 The
court followed the statutory mandate to liberally construe the statute to
effectuate the legislative purpose 465 of simplifying and facilitating land title
transactions. 4' Accordingly, the general reference to "limitations, reservations and restrictions of record" was insufficient to preserve the restriction
which appeared in a document on the record prior to the root because it did
not refer to the book and page where the specific restriction could be found
or refer to the name of the recorded plat which imposed the restriction.467
A most interesting point is hidden in a footnote.4 6' The plaintiff had
tried to convince the court to create an exception to MRTA for charitable
donations. However, the district court wisely refused. 469 The reasons
given were that: 1) to do so would constitute "impermissible judicial
legislation""47 and 2) it was a subject which should be "best addressed to
the legislature. ' 471 However, the best reason for the refusal would have
been the above-stated statutory rule of construction. Any exception to
MRTA would have the effect of complicating and obstructing land
transactions. Furthermore, the one asked for here would be particularly bad.
Title searchers would be burdened with determining whether pre-root title
transactions contained any limitation, reservation or restriction and, if so,
whether the conveyance or devise had been a charitable donation. That
information might not be discernible from the public records, so the inquiry
might be difficult, slow and costly.

462. The court declined to rule on the issue of the plaintiff's standing to bring this
action because it was raised for the first time on oral argument. Id.
463. Associate Judge Diamantis wrote the opinion. Associate Judges Harris and Griffin
concurred.
464. Martin, 643 So. 2d at 114 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01-.10 (1993)).
465. FLA. STAT. § 712.10 (1993).
466. Id. § 712.02.
467. See Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v. Caruana, 623 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993).
468. Martin, 643 So. 2d at 115 n.7.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
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XXII. MOBILE HOMES

Doral Mobile Home Villas, Inc. v. Doral Home Owners, Inc.472 The
appellant, Doral Mobile Home Villas, Inc., owns and operates a mobile
home park with more than 500 lots in Pinellas County. In 1991 and 1992,
it served notices on its tenants that it intended to raise its rental rates. The
mobile home owners opposed the increases and invoked the dispute
resolution provisions of the Florida Mobile Home Act.473 When a negotiated settlement could not be reached, the homeowners' association sued.
Some homeowners withheld payment of the increased portion of their rent,
and the homeowners' association sought permission to pay the disputed rent
into the court's registry. The trial court allowed such payment and the park
owner appealed. The parkowner argued that payment into the court registry
was permissible only as a defense in actions brought by mobile home park
owners against individual homeowners, and could not be used by the
representative association. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed,
relying upon the plain language of the statute. The court noted that the
statute did not provide for payment of disputed rent in an action by a mobile
homeowners' association, like it does in an action by the park owner for
rent. The court opined, "[w]hether this was an oversight by the legislature
or an affirmative decision to limit defenses in section 723.063 to tenants at
risk of eviction is unclear. The statute, however, is not ambiguous in its
failure to mention the association." 474 Therefore, Judge Altenbernd's
opinion4 75 held that payment of the disputed rent into the court registry
was not available to the homeowners' association.
Florida Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Department of Revenue.476
The Association filed a petition with the Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings challenging the proposed rules' dealing with the ad valorem
taxation of mobile homes, arguing that the Florida Constitution prohibited
the ad valorem taxation of mobile homes.47 8 The petition was rejected and
the First District Court of Appeal affirmed in a per curiam opinion. 479

472. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D75 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1994).
473. FLA. STAT. §§ 723.001-.0861 (1993).
474. 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D76.
475. Acting Chief Judge Campbell and Judge Quince concurred.
476. 642 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
477. Proposed Rule 12D-6.001(3) and 12D-6.002(1)(d)1-2, FLORIDA ADMIN. CODE
(published in 18 FLA. ADMIN. WEEKLY 389 (Jan. 24, 1992)).
478. FloridaManufactured Hous. Ass'n, 642 So. 2d at 627 (quoting FLA. CONST. art.
VII, § l(b)).
479. Associate Judge Jorgenson and Judges Barfield and Benton concurred.
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The court noted that the constitution provides that the term "mobile home"
will be "as defined by law,"48 and in 1991 the legislature had redefined
that term so as to exclude, for purposes of this section of the constitution,
mobile homes permanently affixed to land owned by the mobile home owner.48' The court could see no constitutional flaw in the legislative action,
so the proposed rules were valid.48 Judge Benton concurred, noting that
since the litigation began, the relevant administrative rules were amended to
deal with the association's prime concern, that inventory of dealers and
manufacturers might be subject to the tax if permanently affixed to realty as
often occurred with models or samples.4 83
XXII.

MORTGAGES

Anderson v. North Florida Production Credit Ass'n.4 84
' A foreclosure
action was brought on a mortgage of a prior owner, which had been
improperly indexed by the clerk of court. The current mortgagor and
mortgagee were unaware of the improperly indexed mortgage and claimed
that they had priority because of the recording error. The trial court
disagreed and granted the foreclosure judgment to the prior mortgagee. The
First District Court of Appeal affirmed.485 The rule for mortgage priority
is provided in section 695.11 of the FloridaStatutes, which states that "[t]he
sequence of ... official numbers shall determine the priority of recordation," referring to the official number of recordation given by the clerk of
courts when an instrument is recorded.486 Although indexing is a statutory
duty imposed on the clerk of courts, the priority of mortgages is not based
on proper indexing. Rather, it is based on ranking of official register
number.487

480. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(b).
481. FLA. STAT. § 193.075 (1991).
482. Florida ManufacturedHous. Ass'n, 642 So. 2d at 627.
483. FLA. STAT. § 193.075 (as modified by 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-132 and 1994 Fla.
Laws ch. 94-353).
484. 642 So. 2d 88 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1192 (Fla.
1995).
485. Id. at 91.
486. FLA. STAT. § 695.11 (1993).

487. Id.
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BancFlorida v. Hayward.488 The bank appealed an order granting
priority to purchasers of single family homes over the lender because the
lender had actual notice of the buyers' purchase and sale agreements with
the developer prior to the bank's loan to developer. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed.4 9
The developer owned the land which was to be developed. Each buyer
entered into a purchase and sale contract with the developer who was to
build a home on the lot. The developer would, with each transaction, go to
the lender and obtain a separate construction loan for each lot. Each loan
and mortgage was executed and recorded after the purchase and sale
contracts were executed. The equitable liens held by the purchasers, of
which the
bank had actual notice, were superior to the mortgages of the
49°
bank.
Bank One, Dayton v. Sunshine Meadows Condominium Ass'n.49 1
Sunshine Meadows is a condominium equestrian center which was
developed in phases. The developer completed and sold the units in phase
I and then executed a note and mortgage on 1.43 acres to begin developing
phase II. The developer subsequently amended the original declaration of
condominium to make phase II part of the common elements of the
condominium. The bank consented to the amendment. When the developer
defaulted, the bank sought to foreclose the entire condominium, arguing that
its mortgage encumbered property which was part of the common elements,
and that those common elements were an appurtenance to each unit of the
condominium. 4' The trial court agreed with the lender, but the district
court of appeal reversed, holding that the lender's consent to the amended
declaration of condominium subjected the mortgage to the provisions of
condominium law.493 Section 718.121(1) prohibits liens against the
condominium property as a whole unless there is unanimous consent of all
unit owners. Additionally, section 718.107 prevents the separation of an
individual condominium unit interest from the undivided interest in the
appurtenant common elements. The mortgage covered the property which

488. 20 Fa. L. Weekly D761 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1995). The court subsequently withdrew this opinion on rehearing and replaced it with a new one after the end of this
article's survey period. See BancFlorida v. Hayward, 20 Fa. L. Weekly D2041 (3d Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 6, 1995).
489. Hayward, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D761.
490. Id.
491. 641 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1994).
492. Id. at 1334.
493. Id.
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was to become the common elements and not the units. Therefore, the
lender could not foreclose on the units because it had no mortgage on them.
In addition, the lender could not foreclose on the specific mortgaged
property because it was now part of the condominium common elements,
which cannot be divided from the unit interests. The supreme court, in
weighing the equities, agreed that the bank caused its own harm by
consenting to the amended declaration and that it would be inequitable to
subject the unsuspecting unit owners to the lender's mortgage.494
Bay Financial Savings Bank v. Hook.495 The bank obtained a final
default judgment against Hook and other guarantors of a mortgage which the
bank had foreclosed. Hook moved the lower court to set aside, amend, or
reduce the default judgment, arguing that the bank's receipt of monies from
collateral sources reduced its deficiency claim. The court denied the motion
and Hook filed a complaint in another county asking the court to void the
default or reduce the amount awarded and to strike the final judgment from
the public records in the county where the foreclosure had been decided.
Hook was precluded by res judicata. The bank then sought an award of
attorney's fees in accordance with sections 57.105 and 57.115 of the Florida
Statutes. The trial court denied the bank's motion, and the bank appealed.496
The Second District Court of Appeal held that Hook was barred by res
judicata from bringing the same litigation in a different county.
Although Hook voluntarily dismissed his complaint after the bank asserted
res judicata, the Second District Court of Appeal held that "the filing of a
lawsuit that is nonjusticiable on its face offers an appropriate setting for the
fulfillment of section 57.105's purpose to deter misuse of the judicial
system. '498 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with directions
to enter an order awarding the bank a reasonable fee.499
Circle Mortgage Corp. v. Kline.5" The Klines applied to Circle
Mortgage to secure an adjustable rate purchase money mortgage to buy a
condominium unit. The interest rate was to change every twelve months,
with the first rate change to occur eleven months after the due date of the
first mortgage payment. The closing occurred in December of 1991. At the

494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

Id. at 1336.
648 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
645 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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closing, one document contained a scrivener's error, providing that the first
interest rate change would occur in December of 1993, instead of January
of 1993, as contemplated in the previous disclosures. The Kines signed a
compliance agreement in which they promised to cooperate in the correction
of any clerical or other errors later discovered regarding the closing
documents. Circle Mortgage subsequently sold the loan to Beneficial
Mortgage Corporation, which discovered the error. Beneficial refused to
accept the loan and Circle Mortgage sought to correct the error, but the
Klines refused to cooperate. Circle Mortgage then filed a three-count
complaint to foreclose the mortgage, reform the note, and recover damages
and attorney's fees arising from breach of the compliance agreement. °
The trial court held in favor of Circle Mortgage on the reformation
count, but denied the foreclosure and breach of contract claims. Circle
Mortgage appealed the denial of damages, and the Klines cross-appealed the
decision granting reformation." °
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision granting
reformation because there was a definite prior agreement between the
parties. 0 3 "The rationale for reformation is that a court sitting in equity
does not alter the parties' agreement, but allows the defective instrument to
be corrected to reflect the true terms of the agreement the parties actually
reached."" ° The trial court's decision passed the clearly erroneous standard of review.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also affirmed the denial of
damages because Circle Mortgage could not prove actual losses when it was
still collecting the monthly payments. 5 ' The argument of lost sale value
of the loan was unsupported by documentation. Furthermore, after the
reformation, the loan would place the parties in the position they would
have occupied if the error had not been made, except for the litigation
expenses. 5 6 On the claim for attorney's fees, the District Court of Appeal
noted that the trial court had retained jurisdiction to make the award, and
therefore, the issue was not yet appealable."°

501.
502.
503.
504.
1987)).
505.
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Id. at 78 (citing Providence Square Ass'n v. Biancardi, 507 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (Fla.
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FDIC v. Verex Assurance, Inc.508 The Supreme Court of Florida
answered the following certified question in the affirmative for the United
States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit: "Did Fla.Stat. § 627.409
apply to applications for and contracts of mortgage guaranty insurance prior
to the enactment of Fla.Stat. § 635.091 on October 1, 1983?""0
The FDIC brought suit against Verex, the insurer, to collect on two
policies covering two loans made by Sunrise Savings and Loan. FDIC was
the successor in interest of the liquidated S & L. Verex claimed that it was
entitled to rescind the two policies because of material misrepresentations
contained in the applications. The misrepresentations involved overstating
the amounts given as down payment. Section 627.409 provides that when
a borrower misrepresents a material fact in a loan application, which
misrepresentation forms part of the insurance application, the risk of loss
from the loan is placed on the bank and not the mortgage insurer. The
district court agreed and entered summary judgment for Verex. The FDIC
appealed, arguing that the above statute did not apply to mortgage insurance
policies issued before October 1, 1983, such as the two policies in
question. 1 0
The court noted that although chapter 635 of the FloridaStatutes, the
mortgage guaranty insurance chapter, does not contain a provision similar
to section 627.409, that section has been applied to mortgage insurance
policies in the past.5 1' On October 1, 1983, however, chapter 635 was
specifically amended through section 635.091, titled "Provisions of Florida
insurance Code applicable to mortgage guaranty insurance." This new
section did not mention section 627.409, so that it would not apply to
mortgage insurance policies after October 1, 1983. The question certified
asked whether section 635.091 was also meant to make section 627.409
inapplicable to mortgage insurance policies issued prior to October 1,
1983.51
The Supreme Court of Florida held that section 627.409 did
apply to pre-October 1, 1983 policies. 13
The court concluded that the legislature did not intend that mortgage
guaranty insurance should be governed only by the provisions of chapter
635, but also by the general insurance provisions of chapter 627.409.' 4

508. 645 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1994).
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Mortgage insurance is a form of casualty or surety insurance, as defined in
section 635.011, and these are two types of insurance governed by section
627. Therefore, until section 635.091 became effective, mortgage insurers
were protected from material misrepresentations.
FirstNationalBank ofSouthwest Floridav. CardinalRoofing & Siding
of Florida,Inc.5 16 The bank sought to rescind a satisfaction of mortgage
it had filed by mistake. The mortgage secured a loan to the construction
company under which Cardinal Roofing was a subcontractor. When
Cardinal was not paid, it filed a claim of lien and foreclosed. Cardinal
purchased the subject property at a clerk's sale free and clear of the bank's
mortgage. When the bank sought rescission of its satisfaction of mortgage
and reinstatement of its mortgage, the trial court dismissed for failing to
state a valid cause of action. 17
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that rescission
of a mortgage satisfaction and reinstatement of the mortgage is a valid cause
of action in Florida. 1 8
James v. Nationsbank Trust Co.5 19 The appellants purchased homes
from General Development Corporation ("GDC"), and financed the
purchases with GDC's mortgage subsidiary. Nationsbank subsequently
purchased the loans from the originating mortgagee. Shortly thereafter,
GDC was indicted for criminal fraud; the appellants stopped paying their
mortgages, and Nationsbank foreclosed. The trial court granted a summary
judgment to Nationsbank. The appellants alleged that Nationsbank was not
a holder in due course, and thus was not free of the personal defense of
fraud in the inducement, the borrowers claiming they were fraudulently
52
induced to execute the notes and mortgages. 0
The appellants argued that Nationsbank, in purchasing the loans,
became part of GDC's conspiracy to defraud, because the proceeds from the
loan purchases allowed GDC to continue its sales scheme. The Fifth
District Court of Appeal rejected this argument.52 However, the court
reversed and remanded on the claim by the borrowers that Nationsbank was
Such
aware of GDC's fraud scheme when it purchased the loans.5'
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Id. at 1101-02.
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knowledge would preclude holder in due course status for Nationsbank. The
borrowers had alleged that they were induced to buy their homes for more
than they were actually worth, due to fraudulent appraisals which misrepresented their value. Nationsbank was allegedly aware of the invalidity of the
appraisals. The issue of knowledge should have precluded entry of
summary judgment for Nationsbank.
Koschler v. Dean.523 The Koschlers appealed a final judgment
quieting title in favor of Dean, the personal representative of the estate of
William H. Dean, and determining that the Koschlers' mortgage was invalid.
On March 1, 1966, a warranty deed dated February 28, 1966 was recorded
in the public records of Pinellas County, conveying the property at issue to
"William H. Dean and Mary Dean, his wife. 524 William and Mary were
divorced at that time. However, they did remarry later on June 21, 1966.
The two remained legally married until William's death on May 28, 1990,
but they did not live together. Only William lived at the property at issue.
Mary lived with another man and "held herself out to be his wife .... "'
After William died, Mary and the man she was living with, but not married
to, gave a mortgage to the Koschlers on William's residence. The person
who conducted the title search concluded from the record that title to the
property vested in Mary as the surviving spouse of William. Mary and her
boyfriend executed an affidavit stating that no one else had a legal or
equitable interest in the property.52 6
Meanwhile, unknown to the Koschlers, Robert Dean, as personal
representative, began an adversary proceeding in the probate division of the
circuit court against Mary, challenging her interest in the property and
seeking a declaration that she was not entitled to participate in William's
estate as an heir. On the day before the closing date of the above mentioned
mortgage transaction, Robert Dean filed a notice of lis pendens against the
property in the probate division of the circuit court. However, he did not
record the lis pendens in the official county records until 1991 after
obtaining a judgment divesting Mary of any interest in William's estate.
527
Hence, he filed the quiet title action against the Koschler mortgage.
The trial court held that the Koschlers were not "bona fide mortgagees
for value" because, if they had searched the name of Mary's boyfriend, they

523. 642 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see also supra text accompanying
notes 235-37.
524. Id. at 1120.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
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would have found a false affidavit alleging that Mary was married to her
boyfriend.5" The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
this was neither in the chain of the property's title nor of any bearing on its
title.529 The court stated that the Koschlers were entitled to rely on the
chain of title found in the official records, absent actual knowledge of an
adverse unrecorded right.530 The court stated that fault lies with Robert
Dean for not recording the notice of lis pendens in the public records at the
time he filed it in the probate division of the court. 531 "Documents filed
in the probate division of the court do not constitute constructive notice to
purchasers for value of real property."532
533
Metroplex Investments, Inc. v. Precision Equity Investments, Inc.
This appeal by Metroplex, the purchaser at a judicial sale, was based on
FloridaStatute, section 45.03 1(1) as it existed at the time of litigation, prior
to the statutory changes in 1993. Section 45.031(1) provided that the
owners of property in foreclosure, or their successor in interest, could
redeem the property up to the time of the judicial sale. This was consistently interpreted to mean that redemption could occur at any time prior to the
issuance of a certificate of title, which could be subsequent to the date of
sale. The current version of section 45.031(1), section 45.0315, provides a
more limited redemption period: redemption must now occur, if at all, prior
to the issuance of the certificate of sale. 5M
The trial court held that Precision, the mortgagor, had complied with
the redemption statute, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed.535
The judicial sale was held on July 20, 1993 and the property was redeemed
on July 28, 1993. The certificate of title was not issued until August 2,
1993. These facts demonstrated clear compliance with the redemption
statute. Metroplex argued that the purchaser at sale should not have to
search for information concerning redemption, and that the clerk of court
should have been put on notice of any attempted redemption. The Fifth
District Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the statute existing at the
time of redemption placed no duty on the clerk of court to provide
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information concerning redemption. 36 Furthermore, Metroplex had actual
knowledge that the property would be redeemed because the appellees had
notified Metroplex 37
Chief Judge Harris dissented because the redemption was not completed
until after the certificate of title was issued to Metroplex. Specifically, the
mortgagor paid the total amount due to the mortgagee, but the record did
not reflect when or if a satisfaction of mortgage had been recorded.
Additionally, the deed to the redeemer was not recorded until four days after
the certificate of title had been issued to Metroplex. To further complicate
the situation, Metroplex had already conveyed the property to Mark Orman
when the deed to Precision was recorded. However, Metroplex repurchased
the property from Mr. Orman in order to bring this action. 38
While this case seems to implicate the recording act, it is never cited
in the decision. One interesting question is whether, based on the recording
act, Metroplex would still lose because it had actual notice that the
redemption would occur. Metroplex was a purchaser at a judicial sale and
was charged with notice that a right of redemption existed. As Chief Judge
Harris argued, these problems could be avoided by requiring redemption to
occur by depositing the total amount due with the clerk, rather than
extrajudicially with the mortgagee.
Rissman v. Kilboune.539 In 1980, Rissman contracted to purchase
real property in Alachua County. The property was encumbered by three
mortgages. Rissman gave an "all inclusive" note and mortgage to the
seller.5 4
After executing the purchase agreement, Rissman obtained
estoppel letters stating the balances due from each of the three mortgagees.
Two years later, Rissman sued the seller for breach of the purchase
warranties concerning the sewer system. As part of the judgment, he again
obtained estoppel letters from the three mortgagees. 41
In 1990, pursuant to a request for a payoff statement from one of the
mortgagees, the mortgagee responded by stating that there had been an error
in its prior estoppel letters and that an additional $67,000 was owed.542

536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Metroplex, 647 So. 2d at 306 n.1.
539. 643 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
540. An "all-inclusive" note is like a wrap-around, except that here the seller/mortgagee
received only its excess portion of the loan payments; the buyer/mortgagor paid the three
preexisting mortgages directly, as if assuming them.
541. Rissman, 643 So. 2d at 1138.
542. Id.
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Rissman responded with three letters from his attorneys stating that the
mortgagee was estopped from asserting a different amount due and offering
to pay the balance under the estoppel letters. After receiving no response,
Rissman filed suit for a declaratory judgment on the balance. The trial
judge ruled in favor of the mortgagee without explanation. Rissman
appealed, claiming error in not finding estoppel and in holding that his
letters were not valid tenders of the amount due. 43 The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling that the three attorneys' letters were not
tenders because no actual tender of funds had been made. 5 " However, the
court reversed on the claim of estoppel, holding that Rissman relied on the
mortgagee's statements in the prior estoppel letters to his detriment. 45
The detrimental reliance consisted of Rissman's closing on the original
purchase, thereby relying on the amount stated as the balance of the mortgage.546
RSR Investments, Inc. v. Barnett Bank.547 Barnett obtained a foreclosure judgment in the amount of $86,109.59. 48 Due to a clerical error by
Barnett's attorney, no one appeared on Barnett's behalf to bid at the
foreclosure sale. Further, a provision in the judgment required Barnett to
advance the costs of the sale, which it had not done. 49 The clerk of court
allowed RSR, along with another investor, to pay the sale costs. The sale
was held and RSR purchased the property with an unopposed bid of $5000.
Barnett's counsel then filed a motion to set aside the sale, arguing excusable
neglect in the clerical error and the gross inadequacy of the sale price. 5
The trial court found the $5000 sale price "sublimely inadequate" and that
it raised a "presumption of bad faith on the part of the buyer. '551 The
property was apparently worth over $100,000. The Second District Court
of Appeal affirmed, holding that the unopposed bid price coming from an
investor experienced in real estate supported the trial court's finding that the
purchasers were not bona fide purchasers, and it was not inequitable to set
aside the sale. 552
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Judge Quince dissented, arguing that Barnett had caused its own harm
and that the trial court erred in the manner by which it took judicial notice
of the value of the property. Specifically, the trial court did not afford the
opposing side an opportunity to offer its own evidence on the matter." 3
As such, the trial court was not in a position to conclude that the sale price
was inadequate. Consequently, Judge Quince did not believe that the facts
justified setting aside the sale."
United National Bank v. Tellam.555 This decision is very relevant to
commercial banks and has the effect of invalidating many existing dragnet
clauses. The issue on appeal was whether a mortgagee can enforce a
dragnet clause in a promissory note against a preexisting obligation, the
basic purpose of dragnet clauses." 6 The court held that dragnet clauses
are to be strictly construed against the drafter and that debts incurred prior
to the security agreement are not covered within a dragnet clause, unless
those debts are specifically identified in the security agreement itself. 57
The requirement for specification seems reasonable because the lender will
know all prior debts. In addition, the requirement imparts record notice to
other lienors of the extent of coverage of the mortgage.5 '
The majority failed to note that in this case, the dragnet clause was
located in the note, not the mortgage. Furthermore, the note which
contained the dragnet clause was paid in full. The bank sought to use a
dragnet clause contained in a paid off note to make a mortgage, which
secured the paid off note, cover a separate note, now in default. The court
probably could have decided the case on these facts alone, and not set forth
a new restriction on dragnet clauses.
XXIV. OPTIONS
Summit Boulevard Animal Clinic v. Lemon Tree Plaza.59 The tenant
clinic sued the lessee for breach of the option and right of first refusal in a
commercial lease. 56° The alleged breach was the lessor's failure to give
the clinic the chance to exercise its right to purchase the plaza at a fixed
price as provided in the commercial lease. The clinic lost at the trial court
553.
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556.
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558.
559.
560.
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on a directed verdict because it failed to submit sufficient proof that it was
capable of completing the purchase at the specified price. 61 The Fourth
Court of Appeal affirmed in an opinion written by Judge StevenDistrict
562
son.
The court recognized that there were no Florida cases directly on point
t as illustrated by
and followed "the overwhelming weight of authority, 563
the Massachusetts case of Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co. 564 The
optionee would only be harmed by the optionor's breach if he was deprived
of a right that he was planning to, and able to exercise. The optionee is the
one in possession of the evidence concerning his ability to perform, so the
burden of producing that evidence should fall on him. 565 Where the
the ability to perform, the trial
optionee's evidence could not establish it had
566
court properly granted a directed verdict.
XXV. PREMISES LiABILrrY
National Property Investors, II, Ltd. v. Attardo 67 The victim of an
abduction and sexual assault sued the owners of the apartment complex
where she lived. She claimed the owners were liable due to inadequate
lighting and security in the parking lot where the crimes occurred. The
owners filed a third-party action against the Southland Corporation, owners
of a nearby 7-Eleven store, alleging that Ms. Attardo had been threatened
and assaulted in the 7-Eleven parking lot. The trial court dismissed the
third-party complaint and Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed in a brief
opinion written by Chief Judge Harris. 568 The court reasoned that'the
third-party complaint was susceptible to two different interpretations.5 69
One was that there had been two separate assaults, one on the 7-Eleven lot
and one on the apartment lot.570 However, Ms. Attardo had not sued the
owner of the 7-Eleven for an assault on its lot; therefore, the apartment
owners did not have standing to do so.
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Apparently, the second theory was that only one assault had occurred.571 It began when the perpetrator was attracted to Ms. Attardo on
the 7-Eleven lot and came to fruition on the apartment lot. However, the
court found that the allegations did not suggest that any abduction or assault
took place on the 7-Eleven property. This led the court to conclude that
"[a]pparently the security at 7-Eleven ... was sufficient to protect its patron
so long as she remained there. 572 Consequently, there was no basis on
which the owner of the 7-Eleven could be held liable. The district court
suggested that owners of the 7-Eleven might be liable if the abduction
actually began on their lot. The court allowed them the chance to amend
the third-party complaint accordingly if they could do so "IN GOOD
573
FAITH.2
Paul v. Sea Watch of Panama City Beach, Inc. 4 A bar patron sued
for damages after she fell from a tall bar stool while tipping one of the male
nude dancers performing in the bar's review. She alleged that the bar was
negligent in allowing an unsafe and dangerous condition to exist at the club.
Specifically, there was a drastic drop-off of the floor area near the stage
where the live entertainers were performing which constituted unsafe seating
conditions. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant bar, but the First District Court of Appeal reversed. 5
The court stated: "[i]n Florida, a landowner owes two duties to an
invitee: (1) to warn the invitee of concealed dangers which are or should
be known to the owner but which the invitee cannot discover through the
exercise of due care, and (2) to keep its property in reasonably safe condition. 576 The district court agreed that the bar had no duty to warn patrons
of the difference in elevation of the floors because that was patent.
However, a genuine issue existed as to whether the bar was reasonably safe
because the bar may have allowed a dangerous condition to exist through
its policy of "condoning its patrons' consumption of unlimited alcohol and
permitting contact between the entertainers and the patrons who were seated
on high stools immediately next to an elevated dance floor. 5 77 Furthermore, liability based upon this theory, rather than on a theory that the dancer
acted negligently in his manner of accepting the tip, would have made the
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bar's claim that the dancers were independent contractors rather than
employees irrelevant. 78

XXVI. SALES
Bodon Industries, Inc. V. Brown.579 Bodon was an out-of-state
corporation seeking to acquire a concrete plant in Florida. A Texas operator
of a concrete plant learned of Bodon's interest and offered to assist Bodon
without receiving a commission. He hoped to be hired to work at whatever
facility Bodon acquired. He enlisted the help of his sister-in-law, a Florida
real estate broker.
The sister-in-law contacted the seller who executed an agreement to pay
a $50,000 commission, to be split equally between the sister-in-law's firm
and the seller's broker. Unfortunately, the negotiations fell through.
However, without the knowledge of the broker, the negotiations resumed
eight months later between the principals. Upon learning of the sale, the
brokers brought suit against the seller for the $50,000 commission or, in the
alternative, a commission based on quantum meruit.5 8 0 The jury verdict
was based upon the latter in the amount of $100,000, to be shared equally
by the seller's broker and buyer's sister-in-law.58
The seller brought this action against the buyer for indemnification
based upon a provision in the contract of sale that, "buyer agrees to save
harmless the seller from any claim by any party asserted for a real estate
commission, finder's fee or other compensation resulting from any action
taken by buyer., 582 The seller prevailed in the trial court, but lost on
appeal. Judge Peterson, writing for the Fifth District Court of Appeal,
applied traditional rules of broker-client relationships. 83 The court found
that the brokers were working for the seller, not the buyer. 8 4 There was
no contract between the buyer and his sister-in-law.58s Rather, she was
entitled to a share of the commission as the selling broker due to an
independent agreement she had with the listing broker.586 In the absence

578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.

Id. at 667-68.
645 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Judges Sharp and Goshorn concurred. Id. at 36.
Bodon Indus., Inc., 645 So. 2d at 35.
Id.
Id. at 35-36.
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of a selling broker, the seller would have had to pay the full commission to
the listing broker. 87
The court held that an indemnity clause "must be construed strictly in
favor of the indemnitor when such provision is not given by one in the
insurance business but is given as an incident to a contract, the main
purpose of which is not indemnification. 588 This indemnity provision was
intended to protect the seller from being surprised by a claim for a broker's
commission, a particularly unpleasant surprise if it came after the seller had
already paid out the full commission. But since this claim should not have
been a surprise to this seller, the seller was not entitled to indemnification.
Munshower v. Martin.589 The seller agreed to sell a $257,000 house
to the buyer who, under an oral lease, was allowed to move in before the
closing. A short time after the parties signed the purchase and sale agreement, Hurricane Andrew struck and damaged the roof of the house. The
seller's insurance company issued a $17,000 check for repairs. A dispute
ensued over who had a legal right to the funds. The buyer considered the
seller's claim to the funds to be a breach of the purchase and sale agreement
and refused to close. The seller then declared the buyer in default. The
buyer sued for specific performance, a declaratory judgment that he was
entitled to the insurance funds, quantum meruit for the cost of materials and
services paid by the buyer to repair the house prior to closing, and breach
of the oral lease. 590
The trial court relied on a provision in the purchase/sale contract,
stating that if after a roof inspection, repairs were necessary and the amount
was in excess of two percent of the purchase price, the seller had the option
of paying the excess or cancelling the contract if the buyer refused to pay
for the excess. 59' Because of this option, the seller was not compelled to
specifically perform. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 5"
Judge Nesbitt's opinion focused upon a different contract provision and it
expressly placed the risk of loss prior to closing on the seller.593 The
court held that this risk of loss provision, and not the roof inspection
provision, was the controlling clause in the case of casualty loss. The
doctrine of equitable conversion, which would have shifted the risk of loss

587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
641 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 910.
Id.
Id. at 910-11.
Id. at 910.
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to the buyer, was not applied because the parties had expressly agreed to a
different risk allocation.594 Therefore, the seller would be responsible for
the repairs, would have to indemnify the buyer for the buyer's out of pocket
repair costs, and would have to specifically perform.5 95 Consequently, the
seller was entitled to the insurance funds. 96
Ivanov v. Sobel.597 The Ivanovs sought the assistance of a broker to
purchase a home. After negotiations, they entered a contract to purchase a
home for $300,000, placing a $30,000 deposit in the broker's trust account.
To facilitate the closing, the salesperson suggested that the Ivanovs form a
Florida corporation, place the money to close in the corporate account, and
authorize the salesperson to issue checks from that account. The salesperson
then absconded with the money causing the Ivanovs to default on the
purchase contract. After the default, the realtor disbursed the deposit to the
sellers. The Ivanovs sued the sellers, the broker, and the salesperson.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the sellers and
the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 98 The court concluded that
the sellers were innocent and could not be held responsible for the
intentional wrongful act of the real estate salesperson.599 The salesperson's wrongful act could not have been anticipated and it certainly did not
further the seller's interests since it caused them the loss of the sale.6W
The buyers had in fact-defaulted and the sellers were, therefore, entitled to
rely upon the liquidated damages clause."1
It is unfortunate, however, that the court did not elaborate on the
agency relationship which the seller had with the broker and its salesperson.
Traditionally, the selling broker would be considered to be the sub-agent of
the seller unless a different arrangement had been agreed upon. It was not
suggested that the Ivanovs had contracted for the broker to be its agent, for
example, to act as the buyer's broker. Nor was there any suggestion that a
dual agency relationship existed. Consequently, it appeared that the money
was probably misappropriated from the sellers' agent. The court referred to
the rule, "where one of two innocent persons must suffer from the wrongful

594. Munshower, 641 So. 2d at 911.
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act of a third, the person who made the wrongful act possible must bear the
Would the application of that rule put the burden on the agent's
loss."'
principal who, in this case, just might be the seller? It is a thought which
bears investigating.
The contract to buy a sixty-seven-year-old
Wasser v. Sasoni.63
apartment building expressly provided that the sale was "as is" and
contained standard inspection and integration clauses. After the closing, the
buyer had the building inspected and discovered that it had structural
problems. He sued for fraud and the trial court granted summary judgment
to the seller.' The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 5
The court held, in an opinion written by Judge Gersten, that caveat
emptor is still the law in commercial real estate transactions. 616 Here, the
sophisticated buyer had agreed to a contract with an "as is" provision and
an integration clause. There were no allegations that this agreement was
procured by fraud. Moreover, it has long been established that "a misrepresentation is not actionable where its truth might have been discovered by the
He had the opportunity to inspect prior
exercise of ordinary diligence."'
to closing, but chose not to exercise that right. The seller's statement that
it was "a very good building" and that it required only a "normal type of
maintenance" 6 8 constituted only the seller's opinion or, at most, puffing
under the circumstances.
XXVII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
9
Hummel v. Stenstrom-Strump Construction & Development Corp.W
The Hummels, owners of land in Sanford, Florida, contracted with the
defendant builder to construct a home on the Hummels' lot. The builder
submitted the plans to the City of Sanford for approval and then built the
home. The City issued a certificate of occupancy once the home was
completed and the Hummels moved in. Shortly thereafter, stormwater

602. Ivanov, 654 So. 2d at 992 (citing Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Seawright, 134
So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961), cert. denied, 143 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1962)).
603. 652 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
604. Id. at 412.
605. Id. at 413.
606. Id. at 412.
607. Id.
608. Wasser, 652 So. 2d at 412.
609. 648 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). This case was also discussed
previously in Part VI with regard to the issues relating to construction. See supra text
accompanying notes 79-86.
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flooded the house and caused physical damage to the home and its contents.
The Hummels sued the builder for fraud, negligent misrepresentation with
regard to the elevation and drainage capability of the property, as well as
breach of contract. 610 The Hummels also sued the City of Sanford for
negligence in approving the plans and inspecting the builder's work, for
breach of the City's warranties contained in the certificate of occupancy, and
for negligent operation and maintenance of its stormwater drainage system.61 The City asserted sovereign immunity and argued that it did not
owe a duty to the plaintiffs.61 2 The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the Hummel's claims against the City
for negligence in approving the plans and inspecting the construction, as
well as the claims for breach of warranties based on the certificate of
occupancy. 6 11 The court, quoting Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah,614 stated:
We find no indication that chapter 553 [Building Construction Standards] was intended as a means to guarantee the quality of buildings for
individual property owners or developers. We find that the enforcement
of building codes and ordinances is for the purpose of protecting the
health and safety of the public, not the personal or property interests of
individual citizens ....
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal
of the plaintiffs action based on its failure to maintain and operate its
stormwater drainage system. The Hummels were permitted to amend their
defective complaint to state a cause of action under the precedent of Slemp
v. City of North Miami,61 6 which held that such actions may be brought
against municipalities if their drainage systems fail to operate as intended,
617
or do not meet the standards required by the building codes.
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Id. at 1240.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1240-41.

614. 468 So. 2d 912, 922-23 (Fla. 1985).
615. Hummel, 648 So. 2d at 1240 (quoting Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n., 468 So.
2d 912, 922-23 (Fla. 1985)).
616. 545 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1989).
617. Hummel, 648 So. 2d at 1240-41.
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XXVIII. TAX DEED SALES
DeMario v. Franklin Mortgage & Investment Co., Inc. 618 Demario
and the other appellants were lienholders of an unsatisfied mortgage on a
property sold in a tax deed sale. They appealed a partial summary judgment
awarding $125,000 in surplus funds from the sale to Franklin Mortgage, the
last title holder of record.619 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellants had a superior claim to the surplus
funds.62
The facts are fairly interesting. DeMario sold the subject parcel of land
on Worth Avenue in Palm Beach to a Franklin DeMarco in 1986 for
$3,150,000. DeMarco paid $900,000 down and DeMario took back a four
year, $4,250,000 note secured by a purchase money first mortgage. In 1990,
DeMarco defaulted and DeMario foreclosed. In 1991, the parties entered
into a settlement and escrow agreement under which DeMarco was given six
months to perform his obligations under the note and mortgage.6 21
DeMarco was required to quitclaim the property to an escrow agent, who
would convey the property to DeMario if DeMarco failed to perform.
However, DeMarco was given further extensions. Somehow, DeMarco was
still able to quitclaim the property from himself to the appellee, an insolvent
real estate company in which DeMarco was the sole shareholder. The
investment company paid no consideration for the property. Furthermore,
this rendered the escrowed deed ineffective because it fell outside the
property's chain of title.
After the last day of the extension passed without payment, DeMario
proceeded with foreclosure. The court granted summary judgment for
DeMario, but delayed entry of judgment based on DeMarco's assertion that
he had a buyer for the property. Franklin Investment, the quitclaim grantee,
then for filed bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Columbia, resulting in an automatic stay of the foreclosure
proceeding. The bankruptcy court later dismissed Franklin Investment's
petition, finding it constituted a substantial abuse of process and that it was
filed in bad faith as a delay tactic.
However, before the foreclosure could be completed, because neither
party paid $355,002.39 in property taxes that had accrued, the property was
sold at a tax sale. The buyer at the tax sale purchased the property for a

618.
619.
620.
621.

648 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id.
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bargain price of $350,010, leaving a $125,000 surplus. The clerk of court
issued a notarized written notice to all persons having an interest in the
property according to the abstract of title. The notice required that anyone
claiming the surplus funds must submit a notarized written claim within
ninety days. DeMario's wife submitted an unnotarized claim which was
rejected. DeMarco submitted a timely notarized claim. DeMario's attorney
then filed a notarized claim one day after the ninety-day deadline had
expired. The trial court refused to recognize DeMario's late claim.6'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal referred to Florida Statutes,
chapter 197, sections 197.582(2), 197.473, 197.502(4) and 197.522(1)(a),
and rule 12D-13.065 of the FloridaAdministrative Code, and held that the
applicable statute of limitations for claims to surplus funds in a tax deed sale
is two years.' z The court held that the notarized statement of claim
required by rule 12D-13.065(4) does not impose a ninety-day claims bar for
persons otherwise entitled to distribution of surplus tax sale proceeds.624
In such instances, if a "particular lien appears to be entitled to priority and
the lienholder has not come forward and made a claim to the excess funds,
payment cannot be made to other junior lienholders.., and the clerk should
initiate an interpleader action ....625
In this case, an interpleader action was not required because the
appellants had filed their claim, albeit on the ninety-first day. 626 Additionally, the ninety-day time period refers only to the amount of time the clerk
must hold the proceeds before turning them over to the board of county
commissioners. The board of county commissioners can keep the funds
only after two years have passed. Therefore, the DeMarios were entitled to
the surplus.627
XXIX. TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY
City of Punta Gorda v. Burnt.Store Hotel, Inc.62s The City of Punta
Gorda appealed an order determining that a capacity increase fee was
actually an illegal tax. The issue arose from a utility contract between the
City and the hotel, which had purchased an existing hotel property that was
622. l at 212.

623. DeMario, 648 So. 2d at 212.
624. Id. at 213.

625. Id.
626. Id.
at 213-14.
627. Id. at 214.
628. 639 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). This case was discussed previously
in Part XVI with regard to land use planning. See supra text accompanying notes 347-50.
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connected to the City's water and sewer system. As a new utility customer,
the hotel was required to sign an agreement to pay for increases in average
consumption, also known as an impact fee.629 Due to increased consumption, the hotel was charged $154,000. The City argued that the costs of
increased consumption should be charged to the party responsible for the
increased consumption. The hotel argued that because the newly acquired
property had not been changed structurally and existed in the same capacity
as it had under previous ownership, the City had already accounted for all
new increases.630
The court affirmed the lower court's order ruling that the impact fee
was an illegal tax.63' The court stated that impact fees are justified when
there is a nexus between new construction and a population increase
(increased consumption) that will affect the infrastructure and require
additional capital expenditure.6 32 The court noted, "[c]hange of ownership
of an existing business does not provide the required nexus even though the
continuation of the business results in increased usage. 633 Additionally,
in dicta, the court reaffirmed the proposition in City of Tarpon Springs v.
Tarpon Springs Arcade, Ltd.,634 that structural changes alone are also
insufficient to justify an impact fee when there is no showing of additional
usage. The present case would add "and vice versa" to the above proposition.
Davis v. St. Joe Paper Co. 635 Richard Davis, property appraiser of
Bay County, along with Larry Fuchs, Executive Director of the Department
of Revenue, appealed the lower court's decision reversing the property
appraiser's denial of an agricultural use classification for property owned by
the St. Joe Paper Company.636 Section 193.461 (3)(b) of the FloridaStatutes, states that lands must be used primarily for "bona fide agricultural
purposes" in order to be classified as agricultural. The court noted that,
"bona fide agricultural purposes" means good faith commercial agricultural
use of the land. Section 193.461 sets forth factors to be considered in
making the determination. The First District Court of Appeal held that the
property owner failed to show that the property appraiser did not consider
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the statutory factors or no reasonable hypothesis supported the appraiser's
determination that the subject property was not primarily used for bona fide
agricultural
purposes. 637 Consequently, the court reversed and remand638
ed.

Florida Department of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Authority639 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the Canaveral Port Authority,
created in 1953 by special act of the legislature for the purpose of operating
the port in Brevard County, was not exempt from ad valorem taxation on
portions of property leased to nongovernmental lessees who were not
performing a governmental-exempt function.'
The court stated that political subdivisions, such as counties, are
immune from taxation. 6" However, a business-type organization lacking
the usual incidents and powers of a governmental subdivision will not be
immune, and may not even be exempt, from taxation.6" The distinguishing quality is that political subdivisions are a branch of the general administration of the policy of the state, as in the case of school boards, state
agencies, and departments. 64 The court held that the Canaveral Port
Authority did not fit this description, and therefore, was not immune from
taxation. 644 The court recognized that the Port does have an exemption,
but it only applied to property used for government purposes."
Florida Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue. 6" The Florida Manufactured Housing Association ("FMHA"),
filed a petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings to challenge
proposed Florida Administrative Code rules 12D-6.001 and 12D-6.002,
which deal with the taxation of mobile homes, on grounds that section
193.075 of the FloridaStatutes violates the constitutional prohibition against
ad valorem taxation of mobile homes. The petition was denied and FMHA
appealed.647
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The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting the argument that
section 193.075 of the Florida Statutes is unconstitutional."8 The court
noted that "[a]rticle VII, section (b) of the Florida Constitution provides that
'mobile homes, as defined by law, . . shall not be subject to ad valorem
taxes."' ' 9 Section 193.075, as amended in 1991, takes mobile homes
which are permanently affixed to land owned by the mobile home owner out
of the definition of mobile homes. Therefore, by changing the definition of
mobile homes, they are now subject to ad valorem taxation.6"
Judge Benton concurred to point out that since the litigation began, the
relevant administrative rules were amended to deal with what FMHA was
most concerned about, ad valorem taxation of mobile homes inventoried by
dealers and manufacturers on grounds that they were permanently affixed to
realty.651 Dealers often have models or samples on display which are
anchored down. The court noted that, "[a] mobile home that is taxed as real
property shall be issued an 'RP' series sticker as provided in [section]
320.0815. " 652
Green v. Greider.653 Section 125.0104 of the Florida Statutes
authorizes any county to levy a tourist development tax on leases of certain
living accommodations for a term of six Months or less. The Clerk of the
Lee County Circuit Court imposed such a tax on the appellee's rental
condominium units. The appellee responded to this tax by making the
leases last for six months and one day. The Clerk sued and the trial court
held that the tax could not be imposed on the appellee's units because of the
manipulated lease terms. The Clerk appealed, arguing that the six-monthand-one-day terms were in effect shorter because the lessees paid the same
amount and did not occupy the units for the full term. The Second District
Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court's decision denying
the imposition of the tax.6 4
Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre. 655 The Sebring Airport
Authority is a legislatively created public body. From 1970 to 1991, it
promoted and operated the "12 Hours of Sebring" on its property. In 1991,
the Authority leased the raceway to "Sebring International Raceway," a

648. Id. at 627.
649. Id. (emphasis omitted).

650. Id.
651. FloridaManufacturedHous. Ass'n, Inc., 642 So. 2d at 627 (Benton, J., concurring).
652. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 193.075(1) (1993)).
653. 645 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
654. Id.
655. 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994).
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for-profit corporation. The Highlands County Property Appraiser assessed
and levied ad valorem real property taxes on the leased property. The
Raceway corporation sought an exemption under section 196.199(2)(a) of
the FloridaStatutes, arguing that the property was being used to further a
public purpose, as it had been from 1970 through 1991. In the litigation
that ensued, both the trial court and the district court of appeal denied the
exemption. 6-56
The supreme court first set out the general principle that all property
is subject to taxation unless expressly exempt and such exemptions are
strictly construed against the party claiming them. 657 Then the court
analyzed section 196.199(2)(a). The court held that the exemptions
contemplated under that subsection of the statute relate to
''governmental-governmental"
functions as opposed to
5
The former deals with use of
"governmental-proprietary" functions.
governmental property by non-governmental entities to perform functions
which would otherwise be within the traditional administrative duties of the
government. The latter deals with use of governmental property by
non-governmental entities to carry on functions which are for the profit of
the non-governmental entity and would not fall within the valid functions
of the government. Although the distinction is not clearcut, the court stated
that no exemption is granted to nongovernmental lessees of governmental
property when the lessee uses the property for governmental-proprietary
purposes.659 Therefore, because the raceway corporation, as a for-profit
lessee, was leasing the property for governmental-proprietary purposes, it
was not entitled to an exemption from property taxes.6 60
Government-owned property is subject to tax if leased to a private party for
that party's own profit aims.6 6 1
Wilkinson v. Kirby.662 The Lee County Property Appraiser, Kenneth
Wilkinson, and the Lee County Tax Collector appealed judgments granting
an agricultural classification under section 193.461 of the FloridaStatutes
to Larry Kirby, the trustee of a land trust in Cape Coral. The land was
originally intended to be developed into a planned unit development, but
was later used as a tree farm when the prospects for development weakened.

656. Id. at 1073.
657. Id.
658. Id.

659. Id. at 1074.
660. Sebring Airport Auth., 642 So. 2d at 1074.
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In 1991, the trust applied for an agricultural classification, which the
Property Appraiser denied.663 The County Value Adjustment Board
denied an appeal and Kirby filed suit.664 The trial court found that in
1991, eighteen acres had been used for bona fide agricultural purposes, and
in 1992 that number rose to twenty-four acres.665 The Property Appraiser
argued that under section 193.461, which sets out the factors for determining
bona fide agricultural purpose and includes a catch all, the zoning classification was relevant. Here, the property had been zoned for most of the time
as planned unit, also known as PU, and was currently rezoned as residential
development, also known as RD. The court stated that this was not
important because the land was not zoned agricultural even when the trust
purchased it. 666 The Property Appraiser also pointed to the lack of
profitability as a factor. The land trust which owned the farm transferred
trees to related corporations without generating income. The court stated
that the tree farm still had a profit motive and was not a sham.667 Therefore, the court affirmed the agricultural classification of the land.668
XXX. USURY
Jersey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper.669 Jersey Palm-Gross, a real estate
developer, made a loan to the defendant real estate partnership. The loan
amount was $200,000, and the interest rate was fifteen percent for eighteen
months, amounting to $45,000 in interest charges. The developer/lender
also demanded a fifteen percent equity interest in the partnership. The court
valued the partnership at $600,000.670 The borrowers agreed to grant the
equity interest, not being in a position to bargain or seek other financing.
Therefore, the total charge for the loan was fifteen percent of $600,000,
which equals $90,000, plus $45,000, which equals $135,000. The $200,000
loan cost $135,000, which is equivalent to a forty-five percent per annum
interest rate over the eighteen month term of the loan. The loan seems to
have been a mix between equity sharing and a participating mortgage. The

663. Id. at 196.
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lender did not want to be a joint venturer, but did want a portion of the
equity in addition to its interest charge.
The borrowers defaulted, the developer/lender sued, and the borrowers
made a usury defense, arguing the debt was unenforceable because they
were being charged what amounted to forty-five percent per annum in
interest. The trial court held in favor of the borrowers, finding usury, and
the lender appealed.67
The court discussed usury law as stated in chapter 687 of the Florida
Statutes. The cause of action has four elements:
1. A loan, either express or implied.
2. An understanding that the money must be repaid.
3. In consideration of the loan, a greater rate of interest than is allowed
by law is paid or agreed to be paid by the borrower.
4. Intent to charge a usurious rate, sometimes referred to as corrupt
6 72
intent.
The intent is determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances,
including looking beyond just the loan documents.
Civil usury involves loans of $500,000 or less, and an interest rate
greater than eighteen percent, but less than twenty-five percent. Whereas
criminal usury involves any loan amount with a rate of interest greater than
twenty-five percent, but less than forty-five percent. Penalties for civil
usury include forfeiture of all interest charged. If the usury rises to the level
of criminal usury, the penalties include the forfeiture of the right to collect
673
the debt.
In this case the first three elements were conceded by the lender. The
lender argued a lack of usurious intent and pointed to a "usury savings
clause" in the note. The clause disclaimed intent and would automatically
amend the transaction to remove any charges deemed by a court to be
usurious. The court held that the lender had knowledge of the amount
charged for the loan, which established the intent element. 674 Therefore,
"usurious intent" means purpose or knowledge in the way of consciousness,
and not necessarily ill will or corrupt motive. 675 The intent is not negated
as a matter of law by the insertion of a disclaimer of usurious intent in the
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note, at least in the case of transactions which are usurious at the outset.
The only way a lender can be certain to defeat a claim of usury is through
section 687.04(2), which requires the lender to take affirmative action to
notify and refund the overcharge before the borrower raises the claim of
usury in litigation.676 Of course, this section applies to civil, not criminal
usury.677 Here, because the amount charged exceeded the usury limit from
the outset, and exceeded the limit by so much, the court found the savings
clause of little weight and affirmed the trial court's judgment for the
borrowers.678
The dissent, which even quotes Polonius in Hamlet, disagreed and
questioned the valuation of the fifteen percent equity interest in the
partnership, which was the charge which made the transaction usurious.67 9
The partnership was arguably fully leveraged, and therefore, there was really
no equity. Thus, the fifteen percent interest was not worth anything at the
outset. The argument makes sense because it is generally agreed that
money, which is not absolutely payable, is not interest for usury purposes.
However, the elements of the cause of action as listed by the court do not
emphasize this concept. The fifteen percent partnership interest was not
absolutely payable. Rather, it was contingent on the presence of real equity,
and there was no such showing.
XXXI. WATER AND WATER COURSES
680
Macnamara v. Kissimmee River Valley Sportsman's Ass'n.
Macnamara, a riparian owner, fenced-off a spoil island. Section 253.12(1)
of the FloridaStatutes and article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution
provide that spoil islands and navigable waters are public lands held by the
state in trust for public use and enjoyment. The island in question was
formed in the 1960s from the "spoil" produced from dredging a canal as
part of the Southern Florida Flood Control Project.
The Sportsmans' Association, which used the island for recreation, sued
as relator for the State of Florida. The title holder of the spoil island, the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund, intervened on their side. The court held

676.
677.
678.
679.
680.

Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 671.
Jersey Palm-Gross,639 So. 2d at 672 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
648 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

1995]

Brown / Grohman/ Valcarcel

that the association had
standing as a representative of the people in a quo
61
warranto proceeding.
The issue was whether the island was within the water boundary of
Macnamara's lots. Macnamara's lots are government lots. The water
boundary of government lots is the "ordinary high water boundary,"
meaning, the true line of ordinary high water, and not the meander line
plotted by the public lands surveyors.682
The boundary usually results in the land boundary extending less into the
water than when meander lines are used. Using the high water boundary the
area fenced off was 683
beyond the land boundary and into the "federal
'
navigation servitude.
Private riparian owners can exclude the public from portions of lakes
that have been the subject of sovereignty sales. However, Ma'cnamara did
not buy the lake bottoms from the State, and thus could not exclude the
64
public. Therefore, the court ordered Macnamara to remove the fence. 1
Macnamara made an estoppel argument that he was granted a permit
from the Army Corps of Engineers, and obtained verbal approval from the
Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Environmental
Regulation, and the Water Management District.685 Macnamara also
claimed that he paid ad valorem taxes on the fenced land. The court held
that estoppel did not apply because Macnamara had not relied on any
positive act from an authorized official. Furthermore, taxes had not been
assessed on the area in question because the assessors relied on meander line
boundaries.686
XXXII.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey of cases and legislation presents selected
materials of significance to real estate professionals. One thing is clear:
there is no shortage of litigation in the real estate area, although there seems
to be no consistent pattern to the case law and legislative development.

681. Id. at 163.
682. Meander lines are a series of straight lines intended to approximate the shoreline.
Boundaries figured using meander lines will be different from the "ordinary high water
boundary," which is figured by a straight line marked at the furthest point actually exposed

at the high water mark.
683. Id. at 162.

684. Id. at 165.
685. Id. at 162-63.
686. MacNamara, 648 So. 2d at 163.

